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This dissertation examines the relationship between executive word choices and investor 
evaluations. Although the importance of language in organizations and the legitimating 
effect of language for new ventures has stimulated rich theoretical and empirical 
discussion, scholars still know little about whether, how, and when the language used by 
executives at established organizations influences external constituents (e.g., investors). I 
address these questions using two studies. In the first study, drawing from theories of 
persuasion and attitude change in social psychology, I examine the effect of emotional 
messages used by executives on investor evaluations and identify persuasion as one path 
by which executive language influences investors. In the second study, I combine two 
theoretical perspectives, the market signaling theory in economics and the construe-level 
theory in psychology, and investigate the effect of executives’ use of realism words on 
  
investor evaluations. The second study identified signaling as another path by which 
executive language influences investors. Hypotheses from both studies were tested using 
a sample of 4,324 verbatim transcripts of 694 organizations’ executive presentations at 
investor conferences between 2004 and 2010. This dissertation contributes to the strategy 
literature by providing an alternative theoretical framework that focuses on the 
psychological effect of executives’ word choice, and by identifying two paths by which 
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The core research question of this dissertation is whether, how, and when 
executive word choice influences investor evaluation of a firm. It consists of two studies 
that empirically examine two different ways through which language impacts investor 
evaluation (see Table 1). Chapter 2 is the first study; it uses computerized content 
analysis to quantify executives’ use of words to refer to their feelings (feeling words) in 
their presentations at investor conferences and examines the stock market reactions to 
such language. I draw from the social psychological literature on attitude change and 
persuasion to argue that investors will respond positively to executive use of emotional 
messages or messages with an affective appeal. In addition, I argue for a matching effect 
between the message appeal of executive presentation and investor basis of attitude. That 
is, the effect of emotional message on investor response will be strengthened if investor 
valuation of a firm is on a more subjective basis. I used a sample of 4,324 transcripts of 
presentations by executives of 694 organizations at investor conferences between 2004 
and 2010.  The results generally support the prediction that in addition to rational 
message, emotional message represents another effective way of influencing investor 
attitude. Moreover, the effect of emotional message on investors is stronger when the 
amount of intangible assets that a firm possesses increases. These results provide 
important insights to how language can be used strategically by executives to influence 
investors, thereby contributing to research that focuses on the impact of executives and 
their actions on organizational outcome.   
Chapter 3 is the second study; in this study I consider how differences in the 




evaluation of a firm. Specifically, drawing on the market signaling theory, I hypothesize 
and find that executive use of realism—choices that are structured by the conditions of 
the firm—can signal firm value to investors. I also extend the theory to consider the 
substitution relationship between a firm’s qualitative and quantitative signals of quality 
and thus find that the association between realism and investor response is strengthened 
when other quantitative signals of firm value are less informative. While language is 
often viewed as a tool free for all to use, this study presents new evidence suggesting that 
the use of certain type of language (e.g., realism) is not free for all, and in the financial 
setting, language may contain useful information about a firm’s quality, which is 
consequently responded to by investors and analysts as a signal of quality above and 
beyond other quantitative signals of quality (e.g., earnings). 
In summary, chapter two of this dissertation focuses on how emotional message 
that is not systematically linked to firms’ fundamental value can be used as a strategic 
tool to influence investor evaluation due to its effect on persuasion; on the other hand, 
chapter three focuses on how the use of realism words can be interpreted as a signal of 
unobserved firm quality by outside investors because how much concrete details that one 
is able to give when discussing an object or event depends on the person’s psychological 
distance from the object or event. In other words, this dissertation proposes two different 
paths for language to impact investors. 
Table 1.1 Dissertation Structure 
 
 
Essay 1 Essay 2 
What? Feeling words Realism words 
How? Persuasion Signal of quality 







THE POWER OF FEELINGS: EXECUTIVES’ USE OF EMOTIONAL MESSAGE 
AND STOCK MARKET REACTION  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper will use computerized content analysis to quantify the use of feeling 
words by executives during their presentations at investor conferences and to examine the 
stock market reactions to such language use. I draw from the social psychological 
literature on attitude change and persuasion to suggest that investors will respond 
positively to executives’ use of emotional messages, in this case feeling words. In 
addition, I argue for the existence of a matching effect between message appeal and 
investors’ basis of attitude. That is, the effect of emotional message on investors will be 
strengthened if investors’ valuation of a firm is more subjective. Using a sample of 4,324 
transcripts of 694 organizations’ executive presentations at investor conferences between 
2004 and 2010, results generally support the prediction that affective persuasion 
represents another effective way of influencing investor attitude. These results provide 
important insights to how executives can use language strategically to influence 
investors’ attitude toward a firm, thereby contributing to research that focuses on the 





From a sociological perspective, language and narratives have long been argued 
as important legitimating strategies for new ventures (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Pfeffer, 1981). For example, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) suggest 
that due to their lack of external validation, new ventures that use more encompassing 
language to frame their innovations broadly and that use more internally consistent 
stories will appear more credible and legitimate and, thus, have better access to capital, 
market, and governmental protection. Similarly, Lounsbury and Glynn (2001) argued that 
in the descriptions of their business, new ventures that put more emphasis on their 
distinctiveness when the industry is more legitimate and when their invention is 
competence-destroying to extant industry practices will be perceived as more legitimate 
and have better access to resources. 
While the legitimating effect of language for new ventures prompted rich 
theoretical discussions and received some empirical support (Martens, Jennings, & 
Jennings, 2007), we knew little about whether, how, and when language can be used by 
corporate executives in public firms to influence external constituents. Corporate 
executives devote a significant amount of time and energy to informing external 
constituents about the firm’s activities to ensure their understanding and satisfaction 
regarding what the firm is doing and continued support for the organization (Jackson, 
2007). For example, JoAnn Reed, chief financial officer of Medco Health Solutions, one 
of America’s Most Shareholder-Friendly Companies, said that approximately 25% of her 
time is spent informing and communicating with investors (Reed, as cited in Jackson, 




the effect of executive language on investor attitude represents a fairly nascent and 
uncharted territory. Since prior research has focused more extensively on the legitimating 
effect of language for new ventures, it has offered little insight about whether, how, and 
when language can be used strategically by corporate executives to influence external 
constituent evaluations. As a result, the psychological effects of executive language—
such as word choice—on investor attitude and persuasion remain unexplored.  
To begin addressing these important questions, I draw from decades of research 
on attitude change and persuasion in the field of social psychology to provide a theory 
that explains why and when executive use of emotional message influences investor 
evaluation. Attitude is commonly defined as “a combination of an individual’s evaluative 
judgments about a given object” (e.g., a person, an organization, or an issue) (Crites, 
Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994: 619; Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997; Thurstone, 1928). The 
process of changing an individual’s attitude toward an object through exposure to a 
message or argumentation is considered persuasion (Bohner & Dickel, 2011). Because 
outside investors rarely can observe a firm’s operations directly, executive descriptions of 
firm activities represent an important source of information for them. In addition, 
executives are motivated to create a favorable investor attitude toward the firm and have 
a relatively high amount of control and flexibility over the language they use to describe 
firm activities. The process through which executives provide descriptions of firm 
activities to external investors with some interest to change investor attitude toward the 
firm can be viewed as a process of persuasion. Research in persuasion has shown that 
emotional message or messages based on an affective appeal are a well-known means to 




1982; Ruechelle, 1958). Emotional messages refer to statements based on the sender’s 
subjective feelings and emotions, which may or may not be based on factual information. 
Therefore, this study quantifies executives’ use of feeling words to refer to their 
subjective feelings and emotions in their speech as a proxy for emotional messages and 
examines the effect of this language use on investor attitude. Moreover, because the 
various conditions under which executive language influences investors has not been 
examined systematically, I also investigate the effect of three organizational conditions 
(e.g., firm asset composition, profitability, and sales growth) on the relationship between 
executive language and investor reaction. 
Corporate executives disseminate a large amount of information, both quantitative 
and qualitative, about their actions and performance on a mandatory and voluntary basis 
through various avenues, such as press releases, quarterly and annual reports, shareholder 
meetings, and investor conferences. Given that the identification of authorship of 
language is crucial to a study of language use, this study focuses on executive verbal 
presentations at investor conferences because it allows for relatively better identification 
of authorship than other written forms of communication (e.g., annual reports and press 
releases). Research in finance has also shown that investor conferences have emerged to 
be an important form of voluntary communication to convey information to investors 
(Bushee, Jung, & Miller, 2011). 
This study makes several empirical and theoretical contributions to the strategy 
literature. First, by incorporating the insights from social psychology about persuasion 
and attitude change, this study provides an alternative theoretical framework for 




provided a rich understanding of the legitimating effect of language for new ventures 
from a sociological perspective, this study focus on language used by executives at public 
firms and how it can be used strategically to achieve persuasion and to influence investor 
attitude. By integrating the knowledge from social psychology, this study broadens our 
understanding about the ways that language can be used strategically by organizations to 
influence key stakeholders.  
Second, this study contributes to the strategy literature by providing empirical 
evidence regarding the effect of emotional messages on investor attitude and how this 
effect will vary under three organizational conditions: high asset intangibility, low 
profitability, and low growth. While the power of language in terms of helping nascent 
ventures obtain legitimacy and investor support has been documented (Martens et al., 
2007), empirical examination of how executive language (beyond tenor) influences 
investors remains scant. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that 
empirically examines the effect of executives’ emotional messages on investors.  
Third, organization and strategy scholars have long been interested in how the 
behavior of corporate executives affects critical organizational outcomes (see Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004 for a review; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 1996; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Although there is a growing body of research that explores 
the implications of executives’ actions in the financial market (e.g., Certo, 2003; Cohen 
& Dean, 2005; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Wade, Porac, & Pollock, 1997; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1998; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), the effect of executive language on investor 




literature by identifying and empirically demonstrating another important channel—
executive language—through which executive action influences investor evaluation.  
Finally, by relaxing the strong assumption regarding market efficiency, this study 
takes a psychological perspective and focuses more on the general tendency of human 
beings to react favorably to certain types of persuasive language when processing new 
information. While some prior studies have focused on the effect of executive language 
from a more rational perspective, which means that financial market participants respond 
to executive language because it contains information regarding a firm’s fundamental 
value (e.g., Demers & Vega, 2008; Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, & Macskassy, 2008), I 
develop a theory to suggest that investors are motivated to collect and process all 
information (quantitative or qualitative) that they consider relevant to firm valuation to 
improve the accuracy of their beliefs.  Emotional messages that discuss executives’ 
feelings influence investors because they may be perceived as containing information and 
may evoke similar feelings from investors, even if they contain no real information 
regarding the firm’s fundamental value. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Persuasion and Investor Behavior 
Although standard economic theory would suggest that financial decision-making 
should be rational and investors should ignore subjective verbal communication (e.g., 
persuasion), an emerging stream of research in strategy, finance, and accounting has 
documented that substantial movements in firms’ stock prices seem to correspond to 
qualitative measures of managerial language, such as tenor and argument quality (e.g., 




Segal, 2010b; Loughran & McDonald, 2009; Martens et al., 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; 
Wade et al., 1997; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). 
Persuasion research focuses on how an individual’s attitude can be changed 
through exposure to a message or argumentation (Bohner & Dickel, 2011). Because very 
few investors of public firms can directly observe firm operations, the majority of them 
have to rely on secondary information to make their evaluations. Investors have three 
main sources of information: security analysts’ forecasts, publicly available accounting 
performance numbers, and corporate executives’ descriptions of the firm’s current and 
future activities (Tetlock et al., 2008). While analysts’ forecasts and accounting numbers 
arise from complex processes largely outside the control of corporate executives, these 
executives do have a significant amount of control and flexibility over the linguistic 
descriptions that they provide to investors. In addition, a persuasive act takes place when 
“a message is provided by one agent (a sender) with at least a potential interest in 
changing the behavior of another agent (a recipient)” (DellaVigna & Gentzkow, 2009: 
644). In the financial setting, corporate executives communicate with external 
constituents (e.g., investors) on a regular basis to provide information about the firm’s 
activities and performance for the purpose of seeking and maintaining support from those 
constituents. Thus, every time executives speak to investors, it can be seen as a 
persuasive act because it is a speech delivered by a sender (i.e., the executive) to a 
specific audience (i.e., investors and analysts) with the purpose of influencing their 
attitude toward the firm. Of course, investors may recognize that the descriptions 
provided by corporate executives are not as objective as some other sources (e.g., 




interest in the outcome, but they are still likely to attend to these descriptions due to their 
lack of first-hand information. Therefore, in this paper, I view the forming and changing 
of investor attitude toward a firm as a persuasion process, whereby executives need to 
persuade investors regarding the value of the firm.  
Persuasion and Attitude Change 
Attitude change is perhaps one of the most important areas of inquiry within 
social psychology (Allport, 1935; see Bohner & Dickel, 2011for a most recent review). 
Attitude is commonly defined as “a combination of an individual’s evaluative judgments 
about a given object” (e.g., a person, an organization, or an issue) (Petty et al., 1997). 
Persuasion is defined as “the formation or change of attitudes through information 
processing in response to a message about the attitude object” (Bohner, Erb, & Siebler, 
2008: 403).To explicate the process of persuasion, I adopt the unimodel of persuasion 
(Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999) from social psychology. This theory asserts that in any 
given situation, an information recipient’s cognitive resources are limited and therefore 
cannot process every persuasive message they receive in detail. Thus, the amount of 
processing effort they give to a persuasive message influences how likely they are to be 
persuaded by the message. Their processing effort, in turn, is determined by the 
recipients’ motivation (i.e., whether the topic or object is of high or low personal 
relevance), cognitive capability (i.e., whether they possess relevant knowledge to process 
the information), and cognitive capacity (i.e. the amount of cognitive resources available 
for use) (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). The unimodel of persuasion views the process 
of persuasion as a motivated process during which “beliefs are formed or changed on the 




appropriate evidence is determined by what recipients believe to be the basis for their 
judgment. For example, an individual may believe that when an executive speaks with 
confidence and certainty, it suggests that his or her firm is doing well and is likely to have 
a good future prospect. Thus, in this individual’s perspective, the level of confidence and 
certainty that an executive displays in communication becomes appropriate evidence for 
the firm’s expected performance. However, if one has no such belief, one may simply 
treat the information regarding the executive’s confidence and certainty as irrelevant.
1
 
Message Appeal and Persuasion 
Although there are various means to change an individual’s attitude toward an 
object, message-based persuasion has been established as one of the most important 
means to achieve attitude change (Wood, 2000). The means of message-based persuasion 
can be classified into two main types: fact-based cognitive or rational appeal and non-
fact-based affective or emotional appeal (e.g., Becker, 1963; Knepprath & Clevenger Jr, 
1965; Ray & Batra, 1982; Ruechelle, 1958). In attitude research, cognition has been used 
to describe an individual’s beliefs about the positive and/or negative attributes of an 
attitude object (e.g., Crites et al., 1994; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; Ostrom, 1969). Thus, a 
message based on rational appeal typically contains arguments based on the positive 
                                                 
1
Persuasion research in social psychology was guided mainly by two types of models: dual-process models, 
such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model and the Heuristic Systematic Model, and the unimodel of 
persuasion. The effectiveness of these different models is still debated within persuasion literature. Because 
this debate is beyond the current study’s scope and the findings in this paper will not inform this debate, the 
unimodel has been selected because it fits the empirical context more closely. The nature of the process by 
which investors determine the value of a firm is highly complex, and the investment community consists of 
many individual and institutional investors with various levels of prior knowledge and various beliefs. The 
unimodel of persuasion views the process of persuasion as a motivated process during which “beliefs are 
formed or changed on the basis of appropriate evidence”(Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999: 89) (Kruglanski 
& Thompson, 1999: 89), and it does not assume that information recipients use two qualitatively different 
routes to process issue-relevant information (i.e., the content of the message) and issue-irrelevant cues (i.e., 




and/or negative attributes of an attitude object and provides relevant details, facts, and 
figures (e.g., Liebermann & Flint-Goor, 1996; Ray & Batra, 1982). For example, an 
advertisement for a new automobile that uses a rational appeal may highlight the size of 
the engine and the amount of space in the trunk, discuss the value of track and pinion 
steering, and emphasize the car’s performance on different road surfaces. In other words, 
a message with a rational appeal is trying to persuade recipients concerning the value of 
an object by using reasoned arguments to appeal to their logic.  
According to the unimodel of persuasion, the amount of processing effort that 
recipients give to a persuasive message influences how likely they are to be persuaded by 
the message. Thus, some research has demonstrated that a message based on a rational or 
cognitive appeal increases persuasion because it increases recipients’ effort to process the 
message by increasing the number of cognitive elaborations that he or she generates (e.g., 
Chaiken, Liebermann, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Rosselli, Skelly, & 
Mackie, 1995). Cognitive elaboration refers to the extent to which a person carefully 
thinks about issue-relevant information, and it is typically operationalized as the number 
of issue-relevant thoughts generated by recipients when given a persuasive message 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In short, a message based on rational or cognitive appeal 
enhances persuasion because it increases the amount of thinking effort that an individual 
assigns to the attitude object. Other research has argued that the acceptance of a 
persuasive message depends on the presence of incentives to accept the advocated 
conclusion. Rational and logical reasons are considered critical incentives (Hovland, 
Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Therefore, this research suggests that by providing more logical 




enhance persuasion. Empirical evidence in support of the persuasion effect of a message 
based on rational or cognitive appeal is abundant (Chaiken et al., 1989; Edwards, 1990; 
Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). For example, using qualitative 
analyses of initial public offering prospectus documents, Martens et al. (2007) have 
demonstrated that firms received more favorable investor evaluations and, thus, better 
initial public offering outcomes when they are able to elaborate the logic behind the 
proposed means of exploiting opportunities more. In addition, a growing body of finance 
and accounting research has examined the use of positive words to highlight the firm’s 
positive achievements, successes, progress, and performance results in various corporate 
communications, and it showed a significant and positive relationship between the use of 
more positive words and financial market reactions (e.g., Demers & Vega, 2008; 
Loughran & McDonald, 2009; Tetlock et al., 2008). 
While reasoning is a highly effective way to achieve persuasion, it is by no means 
the only method. “Affect” in attitude research has been used to refer to the positive and/or 
negative feelings and emotions that individuals associate with an attitude object (e.g., 
Breckler, 1984; Crites et al., 1994; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; Ostrom, 1969). A persuasive 
message based on affective or emotional appeal may contain statements based on the 
sender’s subjective feelings and emotions, which may or may not be based on factual 
information. For example, another example of automobile advertisement might depict the 
automobile as fun, comfortable, sexy, or exciting to elicit a positive feeling toward the 
product and/or brand. This persuasive message focuses on the sender’s subjective 
opinions or feelings of what the product symbolizes and does not rely on any specific 




attitude change by evoking and influencing the emotions or feelings of the information 
recipient (Batra & Ray, 1986; Edwards, 1990). 
The influence of affectively based persuasion on attitudes has also been well 
established in attitude research (e.g., Chên, 1933; Eldersveld, 1956; Hartmann, 1936; 
Knower, 1935; Mayer & Tormala, 2010; Menefee & Granneberg, 1940). Research that 
investigated the process through which persuasive communication changes attitudes 
found that messages based on cognitive or affective appeal influence attitude through 
different mechanisms (Pallak, Murroni, & Koch, 1983; Rosselli et al., 1995). For 
example, Rosselli, Skelly, and Mackie (1995) asked recipients of persuasive messages to 
write any and all of the reactions they had, including both thoughts and feelings, while 
reading the presented information (regardless of relevance to the message). Using path 
analyses, they found that while the effect of rational messages is mediated by only 
cognitive elaborations, the effect of emotional messages is mediated by both cognitive 
and affective elaborations. Affective elaborations refer to the amount of feelings 
generated by the recipient following the presentation of the message (Rosselli et al., 
1995). In other words, when presented with a feelings-based message, besides more 
rational thoughts, recipients generated more feelings toward the attitude object, which in 
turn, enhanced persuasion.  
In addition, feeling is not free of thoughts (Zajonc, 1984) and therefore may 
contain novel information for investors. While subjective in nature, executives’ feelings 
arise in part from their cognitive evaluations and interpretations of organizational events 
and situations. The appraisal theory of emotion suggests that emotions are elicited by 




& Jose, 1990). For example, a positive and optimistic feeling is likely to be elicited by 
successful outcomes, such as winning a contract, increasing revenue, or being chosen as 
the partner of a prestigious institution. In contrast, a negative feeling is likely to be 
elicited by less than ideal outcomes, such as financial losses, frustrations with losing a 
contract to competitors, or the loss of a valuable customer. Corporate executives who are 
immersed in the daily operations of an organization will develop feelings and opinions 
regarding the current and future prospects of the firm. Given their closeness to the 
operations of an organization, executives are believed to have information superior to that 
of investors regarding the prospects of the firm or the real quality of the firm (e.g. 
Benabou & Laroque, 1992). Therefore, while messages based on affective or emotional 
appeal are highly subjective, they contain information about executives’ feelings or 
subjective opinions about the firm’s situation. Some investors may view these feelings as 
conveying executives’ private information about the future value of the firm and, 
consequently, incorporate this novel information into their valuation of the firm. For 
instance, Demers and Vega (2008) have demonstrated that investors react to qualitative 
language information in earning announcements (e.g., the tenor of managerial language) 
above and beyond the simultaneously released hard information (e.g., earnings). Mayew 
and Venkatachalam (2012) found that the stock market reacts to subtle differences in the 
amount of positive and negative affect displayed in executives’ voices when managers 
are scrutinized by analysts during earnings conference calls.
2
 
                                                 
2 Here, I assume that given the high level of monitoring on public firms and their management by third 
parties (e.g., security analysts, media, and government agencies) and the severe legal consequences for 
deceptive communication because of the Sarbane-Oxley Act of 2002, outright lying is personally and 
financially costly to executives and their firms. Therefore, executives face disincentives to providing 




Research on emotional contagion also provides another reason why emotional 
messages may influence investor attitude. This research suggests that exposure to an 
individual (e.g., an executive) expressing positive or negative emotions or feelings can 
produce corresponding emotions or feelings in the observer (e.g., investors), either 
consciously by imitation or subconsciously. Emotional contagion is defined as “a process 
in which a person or group influences the emotions or behaviors of another person or 
group through the conscious or unconscious induction of emotion states and behavioral 
attitudes” (Schoenewolf, 1990: 50). In other words, a person’s emotional state and 
behavioral attitudes when perceived by a receiver may activate the same emotional state 
and behavioral attitudes in the receiver. A large amount of empirical studies in this area 
have documented that exposure to a positive mood (e.g., images of an individual smiling, 
a smiling customer service worker) produced congruent changes in the subjects’ own 
facial expressions and physiological and self-report measures of emotion (Barsade, 2002; 
Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; McHugo et al., 1985). Hence, the subjective 
feelings expressed by executives during their presentations, although perhaps not fact-
based and, thus, not strictly informative, if positive in nature, may evoke similar positive 
feelings and emotions in the investors and analysts regarding the prospects of the firm. In 
summary, prior research suggests that in addition to a message with rational or cognitive 
appeal, investors may also respond positively to executives’ use of messages based on an 
affective or emotional appeal. Stated formally: 
H1: The use of emotional messages by executives will be positively 





Matching Affective Appeal with Affect-based Attitude 
Within the attitude literature, the affect and cognition distinction has also been an 
important way to distinguish the basis of attitudes (e.g., Insko & Schopler, 1967; Ostrom, 
1969). An attitude is considered affect-based when it primarily includes emotions, 
feelings, or drives; whereas, an attitude that includes more cognitive components, such as 
judgments, thoughts, or evaluations, is considered cognition-based (Edwards, 1990). 
Affect-based attitudes are initially acquired with minimal cognitive appraisal and are 
primarily influenced by individuals’ affective reactions. On the other hand, for cognition-
based attitudes, cognitive appraisal comes first and affective processes only play a 
minimal role in shaping the attitude development. For example, consider an individual 
interested in buying a new car. If the person reads Motor Trends and J.D. Power’s 
automotive ratings, asks friends for advice, and test drives different models to collect 
information about the pros and cons of different car models, when this individual comes 
to a final evaluation that Model X is the best car on the market, he or she is considered to 
hold a more cognition-based attitude; his or her attitude is based on careful evaluation of 
the pros and cons of the object. However, if this individual saw an advertisement of 
Model X on TV, resonated with the image that was created in the commercial, and 
developed a strong feeling for Model X, his or her attitude would be considered more 
affect-based. 
Research suggests that a persuasive message will be more effective to the extent 
that it matches the basis of recipients’ attitude (e.g., Edwards, 1990; Edwards & Von 
Hippel, 1995; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; Mayer & Tormala, 2010). For example, messages 




based attitudes. The rationale for the matching effect is that matching message appeal to 
recipients’ attitude structure can boost involvement and, thus, message elaboration. 
Recall that an affectively based persuasive message is mediated by both cognitive and 
affective elaborations, the matching effect suggests that when recipients who have 
developed an attitude toward an object based on emotions and feelings are given a 
persuasive message that appeals to their feelings and emotions, they will be able to 
generate more affective elaborations (e.g., congruent feelings) and thus be more likely to 
be persuaded by this message. Although some conflicting empirical results arose in 
earlier years regarding this matching effect (e.g., Edwards, 1990; Messe, Bodenhausen, & 
Nelson, 1995; Millar & Millar, 1990), Fabrigar and Petty (1999) resolved the 
methodological issues in prior research and reconciled prior findings. They showed that 
affective persuasion was more effective in changing attitudes based on affect than 
attitudes based on cognitions; however, the opposite prediction that cognitive persuasion 
will be more effective in changing cognition-based attitudes was not supported. Thus, 
there seems to be theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that executives’ use of 
affective messages will be more persuasive when investors’ attitudes toward a firm are 
affect-based.  
The terms “emotions,” “gut feeling,” and “sentiments” are not uncommon in 
studies of investor behaviors (e.g., Baker & Wurgler, 2006; Cao & Wei, 2005; Hirshleifer 
& Shumway, 2003; Shiller, 1987). For example, Shiller (1987) surveyed 2,000 individual 
investors and 1,000 investment managers and asked them to predict market conditions. 
Of the individual investors surveyed, 29.2% attributed their prediction to “intuition” or 




predictions were based on “gut feel” and “market psychology” (Shiller, 1987). Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) also presented empirical evidence that investor sentiment may have 
significant effects on stock prices. Thus, despite the fact that financial advisors often 
advise investors to take emotions out of their investment decisions, many investment 
decisions are based on emotions and feelings. Some even suggest that “gut feeling” and 
intuition are important trading and investing strategies. While to some extent all 
investment decisions are based on emotions and feelings, some investments are 
considered higher in subjectivity of their valuations. For instance, consider the value of a 
young firm with intangible assets, low profitability, no dividends, and ample growth 
opportunities. The lack of a long history of earnings and proven performance track 
record, combined with the presence of high growth potentials may allow some investors, 
especially the unsophisticated ones, to argue almost equally well for a wide spectrum of 
valuations, from low to high, depending on what fits their feelings or intuitions. In 
contrast, the value of a firm with a long earning history, more tangible assets, high profit 
and growth, and stable dividends will be much less subjective. Thus, the extent to which 
a firm’s valuation is more subjective could be a good indication for when investors’ 
attitudes toward a firm are more affect-based. For that reason, I expect that the effect of 
executives’ use of affective messages on stock market return will be stronger when a 
firms’ valuation are more subjective. 
Because no single commonly agreed upon scale or variable represents the level of 
subjectivity in firm valuation, I followed prior research (e.g., Baker & Wurgler, 2006) 
and used multiple firm and security characteristics to proxy the level of subjectivity in 




intangibility increases the difficulty of firm valuation; therefore, it is used as a proxy for 
subjectivity in firm value. In addition, I used a firm’s level of profitability and sales 
growth while controlling for other performance measures to determine how increases or 
decreases in sales growth will influence the effect of emotional messages on investors 
and vice versa. For example, research in adverting found that when promoting services, 
which is more intangible, affective message appeal is more effective at persuasion (e.g., 
Albers-Miller & Stafford, 1999; Liebermann & Flint-Goor, 1996). This research argues 
that compared to products, services are more intangible and thus advertisers may 
encounter difficulties to base their persuasive message on direct features or attributes of 
the services; often, “the service advertiser is left with describing the invisible, articulating 
the imaginary, and defining the instinct” (Unwin, 1975). As a result, messages based on 
affective appeal are more effective. Moreover, recall that rational messages achieve 
persuasion through cognitive elaborations and evoke more issue-relevant thinking; thus, 
when strong and valid arguments are presented, rational messages will be highly 
persuasive (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Rosselli et al., 1995). However, when the argument 
is weak or less than strong, the use of a rational argument might backfire and lead to 
more cognitive elaborations that recognize the shortfalls and gaps in reasoning. 
Therefore, when firms are facing less than ideal situations, such as low profitability or 
low growth potential, rational arguments may lead investors to recognize the growth 
opportunities as well as the lack of profit stream. On the other hand, when presented with 
affectively based persuasive messages that focus more on feelings, investors may focus 
more on their feelings and intuitions toward the firm and situation to make evaluations. 




H2a: The effect of emotional messages on investor reaction will be 
strengthened as a firm’s level of intangible assets increase.  
 
H2b: The effect of emotional messages on investor reaction will be 
strengthened as a firm’s level of profitability decreases.  
 
H2c: The effect of emotional messages on investor reaction will be 




To test the hypotheses, I obtain stock returns, trading volume, capitalization, 
book-to-market ratio from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database 
and historical accounting data (such as return on equity, percentage of intangible assets) 
from Compustat database. Security analysts’ forecasts were obtained from IBES analyst 
forecasts. I obtained 8,990 verbatim transcripts of executives’ presentations from 844 US 
public firms in 23 industries between January, 1 2004 and December 31, 2010 available 
on the Thomson Reuters StreetEvents database. I removed 1,516 observations for which 
Thomson Reuters does not have a record of the presentation and only provides the 
Questions and Answers (Q&A) session. I further removed 353 duplicate observations 
because either a small part of the presentation was mistakenly coded as a separate 
presentation and thus resulted in duplicate copies, or because two identical presentations 
were captured by Thomson Reuters twice (e.g., same conference, same date, same 
speaker, and same word count). More importantly, I removed observations of different 
executives from the same firm presenting at more than one conference on the same day, 
because these same-day presentations could be confounding events for each other that are 




CRSP, Compustat, or I/B/E/S prevents the construction of variables needed for the 
empirical tests. Finally, some firms attended more than one conference each quarter, 
since firm performance data are at the quarterly level, I only keep each firm’s first 
presentation in any quarter. Thus, the final sample consists of 4,324 observations of 
conference presentations for 694 firms in 23 industries. Descriptive information for the 
sample is presented in Table 2.3. Panel A shows the composition of the industries in the 
sample. Panel B is a list of the top 15 conference organizers to provide you an idea of the 
types of conferences used for this study. Panel C provides an overview of the 
characteristics of the industries included in the sample.  
Dependent Variables 
Abnormal stock return. To measure the contemporaneous stock market reaction 
to executives’ use of emotional messages in their presentations at investor conferences, I 
used an event study method to calculate a firm’s abnormal stock return after the 
presentation. Market model return is calculated as 2-day cumulative abnormal returns 
measured around the conference date, including the date of the conference (day 0) and 
the day after (day 1). The event study method is a widely used and accepted method in 
the field of finance to measure abnormal stock return since the early 80s (Brown & 
Warner, 1985; Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997). The rationale behind this method is 
that if investors react to the use of emotional message in executive presentations, they 
will trade the company’s stock resulting in a decrease or increase in the price of the 
security. Thus, the difference between a firm’s expected return and its observed return 
provides information on whether investors reacted positively or negatively to the use of 




extent to which investors perceived the event as providing novel information about the 
value of firm (Brown & Warner, 1985). 
Two approaches are commonly used to calculate expected returns. In the first 
method, using the EVENTUS program available on Wharton Research Data Services, I 
calculated expected returns based on the OLS market model. The OLS market model 
predicts a firm’s expected return using regression analysis that relates a firm’s return to 
that of a market portfolio (in this case, the NYSE and NSDQ equally weighted index). 
Using daily returns, I estimated a regression equation for each firm based on its 
relationship with the market portfolio over the estimation period (ending 45 days before 
the conference and extending back to 255 days prior to the conference). The estimation 
period ends 45 days before the event of interests so that returns at the time of the event 
will not influence the parameters of the model. I then used the resulting regression 
coefficients to calculate a firm’s expected return and subtract this expected return from a 
firm’s observed return to compute abnormal returns for each firm for the event window, 
which is on the day of the conference and 1 day after the conference. While the OLS 
market model has shown to be well specified under a variety of conditions, I also 
calculated the expected returns using a market-adjusted model to show the robustness of 
the results. The market-adjusted model is also a common approach to calculate a firm’s 
abnormal return. In this model, a firm’s abnormal return is calculated by subtracting the 
return of a market portfolio (e.g., NYSE or NSDQ equally weighted index) during each 
day of the event period from the firm’s observed returns on those days. I have chosen a 
short event window to reduce the likelihood that extraneous organizational events during 





Two main methods have been used in prior research to quantify language in text, 
which are judge-based content analysis approach and word count approach. The judge-
based approach involves human judges who identify the presence of critical thematic 
references in texts on the basis of empirically or theoretically developed coding systems 
(Smith, 1992). The word count approach, on the other hand, uses computerized content 
analysis software to count the number of words in a text document that belongs to a pre-
defined category of words. While both the judge-based and word count approaches 
provide equally valid count of information in a text, because the word count approach 
does not involve subjective human judgment, the resulting word count measures are 
considered to be more “parsimonious, objective, replicable, and transparent ” (e.g., 
Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2008: 1440).Moreover, 
quantitative approach to text analysis, such as word count, has gained increasing 
popularity over the past decade in various fields (Pennebaker et al., 2003; Popping, 2000; 
Smith, 1992; West, 2001). Therefore, this paper adopted the word count approach and 
reply on predetermined dictionaries that was developed through extensive psychological 
research.  
Feeling words. Feeling words are calculated as the fraction of total words in a 
presentation that refer to the speaker’s subjective impression of an object or issue, such as 
his or her feelings, opinions, and beliefs. Example of key words in this dictionary are 
“feel”, “feeling”, “opinion”, “view”, “belief” (see Table 2.1 & 2.2 for a detailed word list 
and example statements). This dictionary is constructed based on the Linguistic Inquiry 




Francis, & Booth, 2001) was originally developed to study individual’s emotional writing 
and to discover which features of writing about negative life experiences could predict 
subsequent health improvements (Pennebaker et al., 2001). This program has been widely 
used to analyze word use in emotional narratives (see Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010 for a 
review) and has demonstrated predictive validity of numerous psychological measures 
(Pennebaker & King, 1999; Pennebaker et al., 2003).  
Specifically, each word in a given text is compared with the LIWC dictionaries. A 
dictionary refers to the collection of words that define a particular category. For example, 
if LIWC were analyzing a line in the presentation by Bob Fernaro, the CEO of AirTran 
Holdings, Inc on February 04, 2010: 
“This is our view of what the costs are for 2009”. 
The program would first look at the word “this” and then see if “this” was in the 
dictionary. It is and is coded as a function word, a pronoun, and an impersonal pronoun. 
Next, the word “is” would be checked and would be found to be associated with the 
categories of verbs, auxiliary verbs, and present tense verbs. After going through all the 
words in the presentation transcript, LIWC will calculate the percentage of each LIWC 
category. For example, if I have a transcript with a total of 3,821 words, I will discover 
that 240 of all words in a transcript were coded as impersonal pronouns, which 
correspond to 6.3% of the total words. The LIWC output file lists all LIWC categories 
and the corresponding percentage of each category in a given text. LIWC include 80 
different categories or dictionary of words. Some of the categories are straightforward. 
For example, the dictionary of articles includes “a”, “an”, and “the”. Other dictionaries 




candidates from dictionaries, thesauruses, questionnaires, and lists and then groups of 
three judges independently rated whether each word candidate was appropriate to each 
word category. The percentage of judge agreement ranged from 93% to 100% agreement.   
Net positive words. A message based on a rational or cognitive appeal focuses on 
the positive and/or negative attributes of an object. In the financial setting, positive and 
negative attributes of a firm is closely related to the accomplishments, successes, and 
failures in a firm’s various activities. Firms typically discuss these activities as it relates 
to a firm’s financial health. Thus, the use of positive and negative financial terms can be 
used as a proxy for the use of message with rational or cognitive appeal. I used the 
dictionary of financial negative and positive words developed by Loughran and 
McDonald (2009) to measure the fraction of total words that are negative and positive in 
financial setting and then calculate the use of net positive words by subtract the 
percentage of negative financial words from the percentage of positive financial words:  
Net positive words = 
                       
          
 – 
                       
          
 
 
Although several prior studies have used the Harvard IV-4 dictionary to measure 
negative and positive words (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008), Loughran and 
McDonald (2009) demonstrated that word list, such as the Harvard-IV-4 dictionary, 
which are developed for psychology and sociology may not translate well into the realm 
of financial settings. For instance, words, such as tax, cost, and liabilities, are included in 
the Harvard dictionary of negative words but do not have a truly negative meaning in the 
context of financial markets and are simply used to describe a firm’s operations. These 
misclassified words will add noise to the measurement of underlying financial tone. 




positive and negative word list developed by Loughran and McDonald (2009) to better 
reflect the tone of financial text. 
Intangible assets. This variable is measured as the percentages of a firm’s total 
assets that are considered intangible. An asset that is not physical in nature, including 
corporate intellectual property (e.g., patents, trademarks, or copyrights), goodwill, and 
brand recognition, are all recognized as intangible assets. Therefore, this variable 
captures the proportion of a firm’s total assets that are considered intangible in nature. 
Profitability. Profitability is measured by return on equity, which is the ratio of 
operating income to shareholders’ equity.  
Sales growth. Sales growth is measured as the differences between total sales in 
the quarter before the conference and total sales a year ago, divided by total sales a year 
ago. 
Other controls. I also included a number of control variables to rule out some 
alternative explanations. First of all, I control for whether security analysts made a 
forecast revision after the conference. Using analysts’ forecast of sales revenue provided 
by I/B/E/S, I calculated the percentage of changes in the mean analyst forecast of sales 
revenue as the differences between the most recently reported forecast after the 
conference and the most recently reported forecast prior to the conference (forecast 
Revisions), divided by the reported forecast prior to the conference.  
Forecast Revisions = 
                                                 
                        
 
Another alternative explanation to language effect is that investors are simply responding 
to changes in performance of the firm before the conference. An important criteria that 




analysts’ forecasted performance (e.g. Burgstahler & Eames, 2006; Kinney, Burgstahler, 
& Martin, 2002a).Therefore, I calculated the difference between the firm’s actual 
announced sales revenue and analysts’ forecasted sales revenue before the conference 
(earnings surprisest-1). This variable will be positive if the firm achieved sales revenue 
higher than analysts expected or negative if the firm failed to meet the expectation. 
Earnings Surprisest-1 = 
             –                          
                         
 
To control for firm size, I measure a firm’s total market capitalization (log 
(market equity)) at the end of preceding quarter prior to the conference. I also control for 
the total amount of words (log (total words) in each presentation and included year-
dummies to capture the effect of time. 
Analysis 
 Because the data extended over seven years and I had multiple observations for 
each firm, the observations were not independent and therefore not appropriate for 
analysis with a simple ordinary least square regression. I used a fixed-effect model to 
control for constant unmeasured differences across firms and across years that may 
explain differences in the dependent variables. Fixed-effects models are considered 
conservative because only changes in independent variables within a firm can produce 
significant effects. Thus, a positive coefficient in these models can be interpreted as 
indicating that a positive change in an independent variable within a firm is associated 
with a positive change in the dependent variable within that firm. Table 2.4 reports 
descriptive statistics for all the variables in the sample. The mean feelings statement is 
0.002, indicating on average executives used feelings statements 0.2% of the time during 




contains 3,625 words, this means on average executives use words, such as “I feel”, “my 
view”, “my belief”, about 7 to 8 times during their speech. In contrast, the mean of 
rational statements is 0.008. It means that on average executives used rational statements 
to refer to their positive financial attributes and accomplishments about 0.8% of the time 
and 29 times during their presentations. The sample firms have an average (median) 
quarterly return on equity (Profitabilityt-1) -0.42% (0.28%) and market value of equity of 
$14.98 ($15.08) billion. The mean (median) firm has revenues of $2,909 million ($829 
million). Thus, the sample in this paper is predominantly consists of large firms.  
RESULTS 
First of all, results in table 2.5 and 2.6 show that most of the control variables are 
not significant at predicting stock returns following the conference. The insignificant 
result for most of the control variables is not surprising because the dependent variable is 
firm abnormal stock returns following investor conferences. Since the occurrence of these 
investor conferences are not systematically related to firms’ release of accounting 
performance and thus most of the firm characteristics, such as firm size, market equity, 
and book-to-market ratio, will not change from one conference to another. In addition, 
consistent with prior research on rational statements (e.g., Marten et al, 2007), I find a 
statistically significant positive relationship between rational statements and 
contemporaneous return (Table 2.5, Model 2: coefficient = 0.35, p < 0.05).  
I assess whether investors respond to executives’ use of emotional messages by 
examining the contemporaneous stock market reaction to executives’ use of feelings 
words. I tested Hypothesis 1 in Table 2.5 Model 2. I observe a significantly positive 




results is consistent when I used market-adjusted model of contemporaneous return as 
well (Table 2.5, Model 4: coefficient = 1.11, p < 0.01).  These results indicate that, on 
average, investors perceive positive information from executives’ use of feeling words 
above and beyond the positive information they perceive from executives’ use of rational 
words. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
In Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, I argued for the moderating role of attitude base on 
the relationship between feelings words and stock returns. In Table 2.6 Model 2, I test 
Hypothesis 2a, which predicts that the amount of intangible assets that a firm holds will 
positively moderate the relationship between feeling words and stock returns. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 2a, I observe a marginally significant and positive association between 
the interaction term between feelings words and a firm’s level of intangible assets (Table 
2.6, Model 2: coefficient = 2.20, p < 0.10). Next, I introduced the interaction term of 
feeling words and firm profitability. I find that the relationship between the interaction 
term of feeling words and firm profitability is negative and marginally significant (Table 
2.6, Model 3: coefficient = -38.55, p < 0.10).  Thus, I received some support for 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b. In Table 2.6 Model 4, I tested the interaction effect of feelings 
words and firm sales growth. I observe a significantly negative relationship between the 
interaction term of feeling words and firm sales growth (coefficient = -4.90, p < 0.05), 
thus supporting Hypothesis 2c. Although a firm’s level of intangible assets, profitability, 
and sales growth are only proxies of the subjectivity of a firm’s valuation, the results for 
these three hypotheses together provide some evidences supporting the idea that market 
participants respond more positively to executives’ use of emotional messages, in this 






 A number of alternative explanations can also explain the positive relationship 
between executives’ use of feeling words and stock returns. In this section, I ruled out 
several of the alternative explanations. First, an alternative explanation to the positive 
effect of feeling words on stock returns is that executives’ use of feeling words is 
determined by the firms’ conditions, in particular performance, prior to the conference, 
which also influence firms’ contemporaneous stock returns. In Table 2.8 Model 1, I 
examined the relationship between various firm characteristics and executives’ use of 
feelings statement. While I do observe a negative relationship between executives’ use of 
feelings and firm market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, intangible assets, and prior 
profitability, none of these relationships are statistically significant, providing some 
evidences that executives’ use of feeling words are not systematically determined by firm 
characteristics. In addition, I observe a significantly negative relationship between 
executives’ use of rational statement and firm’s book-to-market ratio (Table 2.8, Model 
2: coefficient = -0.001, p < 0.05) and forecast dispersion (coefficient = -0.02, p < 0.05). 
Since a low book-to-market ratio is typically seen as representing a higher growth 
potential of the firm in the eyes of investors and forecast dispersion represents that 
amount of uncertainty regarding the firm’s future performance, these results suggest that 
executives are more likely to use to rational statements when they have higher growth 
potential and lower uncertainty. This finding is not surprising given that in the financial 




and accomplishments is closely connected to the level of performance they are able to 
achieve.  
 Another alternative explanation to Hypothesis 1 is that the positive relationship 
between executives’ use of feelings and stock returns is caused by a positive relationship 
between the use of feelings and a firm’s future performance. In the other words, investors 
respond positively to affective statement because it is a signal of a firm’s future 
performance. In Table 2.8 Model 3 and 4, I examine the relationship between executives’ 
use of feelings and firm future performance, including future profitability (next quarter 
ROE) and future earnings surprises (amount of earnings above analysts’ forecasts). 
However, inconsistent with this alternative explanation, I observe no systematic 
relationship between executives’ use of feelings and firm future performance.  
 To better understand the nature of information contained in executives’ feelings 
words, I also examined the relationship between feelings words and a firm’s long-term 
stock returns and whether and how experts, in this case security analysts, will respond to 
executives’ use of feeling words. If feelings words are just executives’ persuasive 
attempts to generate a more favorable attitude toward their firms without a systematic 
relationship to firm performance, I would expect experts to see through these non-value 
related persuasive statements. In the financial setting, unlike most of the investors, 
security analysts are considered experts in firm valuation with an extensive amount of 
knowledge about the industry and firms that they follow. Prior research in attitude shows 
that people who had previous knowledge or experiences about an attitude object were 
less attentive to the persuasive argument than people who had no prior experience, which 




Harnish, 1988; DeBono & Klein, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). To examine analysts’ 
reactions, I use analysts’ forecast revisions as dependent variables instead of stock returns 
in Table 2.9 Model 4. Forecast revision is measured as the differences between the last 
reported forecasts of firm sales revenue prior to conference and the next reported 
forecasts after conference, divided by last reported sales forecasts. Consistent with the 
idea that experts are more likely to see through persuasive attempts, I found no 
association between executives’ use of feelings and analysts’ forecast revision activity. 
 Last but not least, if executives’ affective message are persuasive in nature and 
contain no value relevant information, and yet I find the stock market to react positively 
to executives’ use of feelings, I should expect the market to correct itself in the long run. 
In Table 2.9 Model 2, I examine whether the market adjust the valuation of a firm in the 
long run by examining the relationship between executives’ use of feelings and the firm’s 
cumulative stock returns 30 days after the conference. I observe a marginally significant 
negative relationship between executives’ use of feelings statement and cumulative stock 
returns 30 days after conference (coefficient =-2.62, p < 0.10). This result provide some 
initial evidence supporting the idea that in the long run, the market will correct the 
inaccurate positive beliefs of the firm induced by executives’ persuasive attempt.  
DISCUSSIONS 
The results suggest that stock investors react positively to executives’ use of 
emotional message. In addition, there is some evidence suggesting that the basis of 
investors’ attitude toward a firm influences how they perceive or interpret the use of 
emotional message by executives. When investors’ attitude toward a firm is more subject, 




found that executives’ use of emotional message in conference presentations is not 
predictive of the firm’s future performance. Combined with the main results, it seems to 
suggest that although executives’ choices of emotional message are not systematically 
related to a firm’s past or future performance, investors do perceive executives’ use of 
feeling words as containing novel information and respond to it.  
A key part of corporate executives’ job is to communicate with external 
constituents to report and explain the activities and performance of their firm, thus the 
findings in this study have important implications for executives. Although executives’ 
use of feeling words is not driven by firms’ past or future performance, investors do 
attend to and interpret their choices of this type of language as novel information and 
respond to it. This suggests that executives need to be very cautious about their choices of 
words when communicating with investors and avoid communicating information that 
they do not intend. Alternatively, executives can also view the use of emotional message 
as a strategic tool in the future to communicate their private assessment of the firm. This 
is especially true for executives who might be constrained by the firm’s current situation 
to make a strong rational argument. Furthermore, these findings also suggest that while 
some firms and executives may do well and achieve favorable responses from investors 
with their use of emotional message (e.g., Steve Jobs at Apple), this strategy may not fit 
all firms. For example, when investors’ attitude toward a firm less subjective, or more 
value based, investors react less to executives’ use of emotional messages.  
Consistent with prior studies that have examined investors’ response to qualitative 
features of managerial language (e.g., tenor) (Demers & Vega, 2008; Feldman, 




& McDonald, 2009; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008), I also found evidence that 
movement in firms’ stock prices seem to correspond to qualitative measure of managerial 
language. However, while prior studies have focused more on quarterly earning calls and 
annual reports, this paper focused on managerial presentations at investor conferences, a 
form of voluntary and direct face-to-face communications between corporate executives 
and investors that is becoming an increasingly important communication mechanism 
between organizations and investors. The focus on the use of persuasive message based 
on affective appeal in this paper also differs from these prior studies.  
I also acknowledge the limitations of this study and suggest ways in which future 
research can address these shortcomings. First, findings in this study may not generalize 
to other contexts, such as initial public offerings. It is possible that if I had conducted the 
study using other written communication between executives and investors, such as 
annual reports or if I had conducted the study using the prospects of initial public offering 
firms, I might have found different results, since the use of persuasive message might be 
less prevalent and noticeable in written format. Future research might advance our 
understanding in this area by addressing these alternative explanations and examining the 
effect of emotional language in the setting of initial public offering and compare and 
contrast the characteristics of managerial language used in written versus verbal 
communications and how investor responses vary depending on the communication 
mechanism. Second, there is always the possibility that the identified characteristics of 
managerial language in this study might be correlated with unobservable characteristics 
of the organizations and the presenting executives. While I have tried to limit the 




using a firm and year fixed-effect model and thus holding time invarying characteristics 
of firms and year constant and compare the use of language by the same firm across time 
and by controlling for many conventional firm characteristics that have been identified by 
prior literature to influence stock market reaction, I nevertheless were unable to rule out 
this possibility entirely.  
Third, the study of persuasive message only represents one of the many ways that 
an individual can achieve persuasion. Communication experts generally agree that beside 
verbal content, there are various nonverbal attributes (e.g. facial expression and gestures) 
and vocal attributes (e.g. voice intonation, speed, and volume) that may influence 
persuasion (e.g. Mehrabian, 1971). For instance, Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012) have 
demonstrated that investors do incorporate managerial expression of emotional states via 
vocal cues (e.g. voice) into stock prices. Thus, another fruitful avenue for future research 
might be to explore how nonverbal cues of emotional information in investor 
presentations influence stock reaction. Fourth, the sample of firms included in this study 
are either firms who have been invited by Thomson Reuter to be covered in their 
StreetEvent service because of its important role in an industry or firms who were 
covered through the request of the firm or institutional investors to Thomson Reuters, 
thus represent a group of firms that are larger in size and with a higher level of 
performance than average firm. As a result, this may limit the generalizability of the 






Table 2.1 Word List for Rational and Emotional Message 
 









Feel/felt/feeling, point of view, opinion, belief, believed 
 
 
Able, abundant, accomplish, achieve, advantage, assure, attain, attractive, beautiful, 
benefit, better, collaborate, compliment/complimentary, delighted, despite, 
diligently, distinction, easy, effective, efficiencies, enable, enhance, enjoy, 
excellence, exceptionally, excited/exciting, exclusive, favorable, gain, good, great, 
happy, impressive, improve, innovating/innovation, leadership, leading, 
opportunities, outstanding,  pleased, pleasure, positive, profitability, progress, 











We actually/certainly/definitely/clearly/always feel…; We all feel…; I/We also 
feel…; We really do feel…; We now feel…; We obviously feel…; I don’t/didn’t 
feel…; We continue to feel…; …makes us all feel…;  
 
Our belief is…; It is our belief that…; My personal belief is that…;  
 
We’ve always believed…; We certainly believed…; Nobody else believed in…; 
We never really believed…; We are a company that believes…;  
 
In our /my opinion…; It’s my/our opinion that …;  
 
I personally think…; I personally believe…;  
 








An/another advancement in …; Make significant/substantial advancement in…; 
Has made continuing advances in …; With significant advances in …; We are 
advancing..;  
 
An advantage in/for us …; We’ve got/we have an advantage…; This give us an 
advantage…; We have a competitive advantage …; …give/provide us a competitive 
advantage…; 
 
Attractive market/position/service/growth profile/business model/in the US 
market/price/opportunities/businesses 
 
We have become more efficient…; …allow us to be more efficient…;  
 






We always/already/do/will be able to/continue to/are fortunate to /are well-
positioned/ to enjoy…; …allowed/enabled us to enjoy…;  
 
We have done/we’re doing a good job in/with/of…; We are going to have pretty 
good…; We are in pretty good…;  
 
We did/are doing/has done a great job in…; It’s been a great…; …which has been a 
great …; It turned out being a great…;  
 
We have the highest…; …that is the highest…; …is one of the highest…; It’s 
probably the highest…;  
 
Improving product/quality/performance/operations/gross margins/cost 
structure/efficiency/ 
 
We have …strong/successful/technical innovation …; 
 
We are the leading…;  
 
We do have/still got opportunities in …; …give us additional opportunities…; We 
see opportunities…; …building opportunities to …;  
 
We have been very pleased with …;  
 
We will/continue/ to have a positive outlook/impact/effect/growth/sign 
 
Our effort to strengthen…; We continue/we’re going to strengthen…;  
 
We maintain a strong…; We are very strong in …; …continue to be strong …; 
…because of our strong…; 
 
We’re having/seeing/have seen a lot of success in…; …a track record of success…;  
 
Tremendous improvement/success/growth/amount of opportunity/value/sure 
 







Examples of Persuasive Messages 
 
Emotional Message 
So a better macroeconomic climate, which is translating to better pricing throughout the industry, 
along with our own ability to help ourselves with how we manage our capacity makes us feel 
very optimistic about 2010. 
 
I think a year ago at this time we were growing double-digit and oil was around $90 and we didn't 
know which way it was going. Certainly a lot has changed since then, and I can tell you, we feel 
heck of a lot better today standing up here and looking out than I did once before, as I did it a 
year ago. 
 
If you look at the chart, I mean including the premiums, with the premiums, we are somewhere 
between $65 and $80 on 40% of our fuel. And we feel pretty good about it. 
 
When we sell a box, there's service associated with it. Our attach rate on the initial service sales is 
over 90%, on renewals it's over 80%. And this deferred revenue gives me the picture of the 
future. That's what makes me feel very confident, since I'll be recognizing this 160 million, the 
bulk of it, over the next 12 months, confidence in our growth continuing on the service side. 
 
From a macro standpoint, we feel good about the positioning of the majority of the portfolio.  
 
We feel very good about the strength of the leadership that we have in this business. 
 
From the standpoint of the engineering spend, the visibility that we have in terms of the forward 
profitability that we will get out of 77, we feel that we've done an absolutely outstanding job 
compared to the peers. 
 
When we had our restructuring back in 2003, I think we and our various constituencies felt like 
we had done the right thing and unfortunately shortly thereafter, everybody else tumbled into 
bankruptcy and took their labor costs that much lower. 
 
In terms of our outlook, first-quarter capacity is up 7 to 8%; for the year, 3 to 4. Our unit revenue 
of projection or outlook for the first quarter is 2.5 to 3.5%. We certainly believed it would be 
much higher than that in the second quarter. 
 
We feel good about the progress we are making; we feel good in general about the state of end 
market conditions and our ability to perform and execute in this environment. We have talked 
about aerospace. What is really driving that of course is the strength of the recovery. The other 
thing we are benefiting from is the investments that we made through the down cycle.  
 
We feel we are very, very well-positioned for that recovery. Now just a near-term performance, 











If you look at our first advantage, it's cost. We have a 20 percent cost advantage over Delta, and 
35 over US Air, as reported by the DOT. If you normalize that for a 600-mile stage length (ph), 
which is our average stage length, that cost advantage goes to 35 percent over Delta, 50 percent 
over US Airways -- and this is after US Airways have restructured their costs in the bankruptcy 
courts. 
 
Another key to our success is great labor relations -- I won't go into a lot of detail here, but we 
have contracts in place with the pilots and mechanics into 2005. We are in current negotiations 
with the flight attendants. We actually reached an agreement with them last year. 
 
We have invested a lot of money in technology, kiosks, and other systems across our network. 
We have superb labor relations, which is something radically different than any of the other -- 
most of the other -- airlines could claim. And in 2003, we did a pretty remarkable job of 
improving our balance sheet and our liquidity position. So we are in very good steps (ph) to 
continue ramping up our growth. 
 
At the end of the third quarter '08, we reached $376 million -- in putting it in relative terms that's 
about 31% of last 12 months revenue, so we have a very strong liquidity position, and on a 
relative basis when you look at it versus other airlines, also looks quite strong. Then, on 
financing, and we are all I think facing a tighter market, we have improved our leverage 
indicators. 
 
For the quarter, you can see Delta's financial strengths exhibited in its pretax results and its 
underlying drivers of those pretax results, obviously, the strong cost discipline at Delta that 
we've maintained throughout the year and for several years, the strong liquidity balance Delta 
maintains, $5.8 billion at September 30th, and very important, achievement of the merger 











Panel A: Industry Composition 
 
IID # of Industries # of Companies # of Transcripts 
01 Aerospace & Defense 41 524 
02 Airlines 19 119 
03 Automobile 10 101 
04 Beverages 14 97 
05 Biotechnology 100+ 1446 
06 Communication Equipment 69 810 
07 Electric Utilities 21 311 
08 Electrical Equipment 41 253 
09 Electrical, Instruments, & Components 61 443 
10 Food & Staples Retailing 16 224 
11 Food Products 42 324 
12 Health Care Equipment & Supplies 100+ 1056 
13 Health Care Providers & Services NA 366 
14 Health Care Technology 14 80 
15 Household Durables 31 347 
16 Household Product 10 160 
17 Insurance 79 634 
18 Internet Retailing & Internet Software NA 267 
19 Metals & Mining 35 95 
20 Multiline Retail 15 173 
21 Multi-utilities 23 372 
22 Pharmaceuticals 89 775 
23 Water Utilities 2 13 
 
Total 632 8990 
 
Panel B:  Conference Organizers 
Top 15 Conference Organizers Frequency Percent of Sample 
JPMorgan 107 8.29 
Morgan Stanley 98 7.59 
Credit Suisse 85 6.58 
Bank of America 71 5.5 
Deutsche Bank Securities 69 5.34 
Cowen and Company 53 4.11 
Smith Barney Citigroup 51 3.95 
UBS 50 3.87 
Raymond James 49 3.8 




Barclays 31 2.4 
Thomas Weisel Partners 28 2.17 
Bear, Stearns & Co 27 2.09 
Merrill Lynch 27 2.09 
All Other Investment Banks Combined 459 9.91 
Industry Association 40 3.1 
Total 1,291 100 
 
 























High     Low     
High Electrical Equipment 41 253 Pharmaceuticals 89 775 
 
Electrical, Instruments, & 
Components 
61 443 Automobile 
10 101 
 
Aerospace & Defense 41 524 Household Durables 31 347 
 
Biotechnology 100+ 1446 Household Product 10 160 
 
Total 143 2666 Total 140 1383 
Low 
Health Care Equipment & 
Supplies 
100+ 1056 Electric Utilities 
21 311 
 
Health Care Providers & 
Services 
NA 366 Multi-utilities 
23 372 
 
Health Care Technology 14 80 Water Utilities 2 13 
 
Metals & Mining 35 95 Beverages 14 97 
 
  





Equipment 69 810 
 
Total 49 1597 Total 171 1927 
*Industry uncertainly and R&D intensity are ranked based on Folta, Johnson, & O'Brien (2006) 
1Industry uncertainty is calculated as the random variances in the stock market indices in these industries between 1950 and 2000; 







Means and Correlations 
 
    Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Market model returns 0.003 0.04 -0.54 0.46 1.00 
               
                      2 Market-adj. Returns 0.003 0.04 -0.54 0.46 0.94 
               
      
(0.00) 
               3 Long-term returns 0.001 0.17 -0.99 3.50 0.11 0.07 
              
      
(0.00) (0.00) 
              4 Feelings words 0.002 0.001 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
             
      
(0.33) (0.37) (0.67) 
             5 Net positive words 0.008 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.01 
            
      
(0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.66) 
            6 Log (Total Words) 8.059 0.66 3.58 9.56 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.03 
           
      
(0.16) (0.38) (0.87) (0.00) (0.05) 
           7 Log (Market equity) 14.98 1.90 8.74 19.45 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.24 -0.02 
          
      
(0.71) (0.84) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) 
          8 Book-to-market 0.535 0.43 -0.23 1.73 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.04 -0.10 0.01 -0.12 
         
      
(0.03) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) 
         9 Forecast Dispersion 0.005 0.02 0.00 0.53 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.24 0.13 
        
      
(0.04) (0.00) (0.38) (0.30) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) 
        10 Forecast Revisions 0.016 0.23 -1.00 9.23 0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 
       
      
(0.89) (0.75) (0.02) (0.64) (0.52) (0.37) (0.01) (0.00) (0.25) 
       11 Intangible Assets 0.196 0.20 0.00 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.17 -0.06 0.21 0.01 -0.14 -0.01 
      
      
(0.58) (0.46) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.69) 
      12 Profitability 0.015 0.02 0.00 0.56 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.21 -0.21 0.01 0.18 0.05 
     
      
(0.52) (0.54) (0.82) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) 
     13 Sales Growth 0.074 0.37 -6.73 1.45 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.15 -0.01 0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.05 
    
      
(0.34) (0.11) (0.32) (0.09) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.67) (0.00) (0.00) (0.62) (0.00) 
    14 Future Profitability -0.17 9.08 -625.50 24.29 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 
   
      
(0.81) (0.96) (0.43) (0.74) (0.12) (0.26) (0.03) (0.24) (0.58) (0.82) (0.21) (0.48) (0.75) 
   15 Prior Profitability -0.04 2.19 -121.94 38.83 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 
  
      
(0.14) (0.02) (0.33) (0.36) (0.03) (0.67) (0.00) (0.80) (0.39) (0.30) (0.06) (0.05) (0.95) (0.47) 
  16 Future Earnings Surprises 0.044 0.95 -2.47 54.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.10 -0.00 -0.00 
 
      
(0.52) (0.53) (0.25) (0.44) (0.10) (0.96) (0.00) (0.37) (0.01) (0.52) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.89) 
 17 Prior Earnings Surprises 0.066 0.26 -0.61 0.94 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.18 0.09 0.08 0.15 -0.05 -0.04 0.20 0.01 -0.00 0.27 





The Association between Executives’ Use of Feeling Statements and Stock Returns 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between the fractions of feeling words 
(feeling words) in executive presentations at investor conferences and firms’ cumulative abnormal stock return on the 
day of the conference and the day after. The two different dependent variables are the firm’s abnormal stock returns 
predicted using the market model (market return) and market-adjusted model (market-adj return). I used the market 
model with a [-255, -45] trading day estimation period relative to the day of conference as the benchmark for expected 
returns. The key independent variable is feeling words, the fractions of total words in an executive’s speech that refer to 
his or her feelings. The key control variable is the fractions of financial positive words minus financial negative words 
in a presentation (net positive words). This variable is used to proxy the use of rational message. Each regressions also 
includes a number of other control variables, such as the length of presentations (log(total words)), firm size 
(log(market equity)), the ratio of book equity to market equity at the end of the preceding quarter (book-to-market), the 
standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast in the most recent time period prior to the conference (forecast 
dispersiont-1), analysts’ revision of earnings forecast immediately following the conference as compared to earnings 
forecasts reported prior to the conference (forecast revisionst+1), the fraction of the firm’s total assets that are intangible 
(intangible assets), firms’ profitability in the most recent quarter prior to the conference (profitabilityt-1), and the 
amount of changes in firms’ sales from one quarters preceding the conference to the current quarter (sale growth). Year 
dummies are also included as controls (year fixed effects). Standard errors clustered by industry sectors are presented in 
parentheses. **, * , +: significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively in a two-tailed test. 















Net positive words 0.354* 0.346* 0.297+ 0.288+ 
 
(0.138) (0.137) (0.150) (0.147) 
Log (Total words) -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (Market equity) -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Book-to-market 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.011 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) 
Forecast Dispersiont-1 -0.030 0.016 -0.016 0.058 
 
(0.115) (0.081) (0.155) (0.079) 
Forecast Revisionst+1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Intangible assets 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.005 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Profitability -0.037 -0.037 -0.041 -0.039 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) 
Sales growth 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Fixed Effects 
    Firm Y Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.061 0.062 0.029 0.023 
 
(0.043) (0.046) (0.041) (0.042) 
Observations 4,377 4,324 4,377 4,324 
R-squared 0.01 0.010 0.010 0.012 
Number of Firms 713 694 713 694 





The Association between the Interactions of Executives’ Feeling Statements and Stock Returns 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between the interaction between feeling 
words and intangible assets (feelings*intangible assets), the interaction between feeling words and profitability 
(feelings*profitability), and the interaction between feeling words and sales growth (feelings*sales growth), and the 
firms’ cumulative abnormal stock return on the day of the conference and the day after. The two different dependent 
variables are the firm’s abnormal stock returns predicted using the market model (market return) and market-adjusted 
model (market-adj return). I used the market model with a [-255, -45] trading day estimation period relative to the day 
of conference as the benchmark for expected returns. Each regression controls for the direct relationship between the 
fractions of feeling words (feeling words), the fractions of financial positive words minus financial negative words (net 
positive words), the fraction of firm’s total assets that are intangible (intangible assets), firms’ most recently announced 
profitability prior to the conference (profitabilityt-1), and the amount of changes in firms’ sales from one quarters 
preceding the conference to the current quarter (sale growth), and stock returns. Each regressions also includes a 
number of other control variables, such as the length of a presentation (log(total words)), firm size (log(market equity)), 
the ratio of book equity to market equity at the end of the preceding quarter (book-to-market), the standard deviation of 
analysts’ earnings forecast in the most recent time period prior to the conference (forecast dispersiont-1), and analysts’ 
revision of earnings forecast immediately following the conference as compared to earnings forecasts reported prior to 
the conference (forecast revisionst+1). Year dummies are also included as controls (year fixed effects). Standard errors 
clustered by industry sectors are presented in parentheses. **, * , +: significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 














  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Feeling words 0.905** 0.484* 1.520** 1.074** 1.121* 1.298+ 
 
(0.172) (0.191) (0.281) (0.303) (0.386) (0.605) 
Intangible assets 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.008+ 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Profitability -0.037 -0.037 0.019 -0.035 0.009 0.013 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.049) (0.027) (0.047) (0.041) 
Sales growth 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.011** 0.011** 0.013** 
 




















   
-4.898* -4.641+ -5.621* 
    
(2.010) (2.006) (2.229) 
Net positive words 0.346* 0.351* 0.344* 0.350* 0.352* 0.295+ 
 
(0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.135) (0.135) (0.144) 
Log (Total words) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (Market equity) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004+ -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Book-to-market 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.011 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) 
Forecast Dispersiont-1 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.010 0.011 0.053 
 
(0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) 
Forecast Revisions t+1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Fixed Effect 
      
Firm Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.062 0.062 0.060 0.068 0.067 0.029 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.037) 
Observations 4,324 4,324 4,324 4,324 4,324 4,324 
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.016 





Figure 2.1: The 
Interaction Effect of 
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Figure 2.2: The  
Interaction Effect of 
Feeling Words and 













Figure 2.3: The  
Interaction Effect  
of Feeling Words  






Economic Significance of Feeling and Rational Statements 
This table reports the economic significance of the effect of feeling words (feeling words), net positive words (net 
positive words), and the interactions between feeling words and intangible assets (feelings*intangible assets), 
profitability (feelings*profitability), and sales growth (feelings*sales growth), on abnormal stock returns predicted 
using the market model (market return) and market-adjusted model (market-adj. return). Economic significance is 
defined as the product of the coefficient and standard deviation of the variable of interest. The coefficients used in this 
table are obtained from Table 6 and 7.  
Type of Message Standard Deviation Coefficient 
Economic 
Significance t-stat 
     Dependent Variable = Market Model Stock Returns 
Feeling words 0.001 0.905 0.13% 5.25 
Net positive words 0.007 0.346 0.25% 2.53 
     Dependent Variable = Market-adjusted Model Stock Returns 
Feeling words 0.001 1.111 0.15% 5.43 
Net positive words 0.007 0.288 0.21% 1.95 
     Dependent Variable = Market Model Stock Returns 
Feeling*Intangible Assets 0.0005 2.200 0.10% 1.95 
Feeling*Profitability 0.00004 -38.547 -0.17% -2.00 
Feeling*Sales Growth 0.0008 -4.898 -0.42% -2.44 
     Dependent Variable = Market-adjusted Model Stock Returns 
Feeling*Intangible Assets 0.0005 2.849 0.13% 3.14 
Feeling*Profitability 0.00004 -44.206 -0.19% -3.55 
Feeling*Sales Growth 0.0008 -5.911 -0.50% -2.63 








The Associations between Firm Characteristics and Executive Choice of Message Appeal 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between firm characteristics and the 
fractions of feeling words (feeling words) and the fractions of financial positive words minus financial negative words 
(net positive words) in executive presentations. The key independent variables are, firms’ profitability in the most 
recent quarter prior to the conference (profitabilityt-1), firm size (log(market equity)), firms’ ratio of book equity to 
market equity (book-to-market), the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast in the most recent time period 
prior to the conference (forecast dispersiont-1), the fraction of the firms’ total assets that are intangible (intangible 
assets), and the amount of changes in firms’ sales revenue from one quarters preceding the conference to the current 
quarter (sale growth). I control for the length of a presentation (log(total words)). Standard errors clustered by industry 
sectors are presented in parentheses. **, * , +: significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively in a two-tailed test. 
  Feeling Words Net Positive Words 
  (1) (2) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.000* 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Market equity) -0.000 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Book-to-market -0.000 -0.001* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Forecast dispersiont-1 0.001 -0.021* 
 
(0.001) (0.009) 
Intangible assets -0.000 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.002) 
Sales Growth 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Log (Total Words) 0.000 0.001+ 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed Effects 
  Firm Y Y 
Year Y Y 
Constant 0.000 -0.007 
 
(0.001) (0.005) 
Observations 4,443 4,443 
R-squared 0.010 0.025 
Number of firms 720 720 





The Association between Executives’ Use of Feeling Words and Future Profitability and 
Future Earnings Surprises 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between the fractions of feeling words 
(feeling words) in executive presentations and firms’ future performance indicators: firms’ return on equity in the 
quarter after the conference (future profitability) and the differences between firms’ actual reported earnings and 
analysts’ earnings forecast in the quarter after the conference (future earnings surprises). The key independent variable 
is feeling words, the fractions of total words in an executive’s speech that refer to his or her feelings. The key control 
variable is the fractions of financial positive words minus financial negative words in a presentation (net positive 
words). Each regressions also includes a number of other control variables, such as the differences between most 
recently reported firms’ earnings and analysts’ earnings forecast prior to the conference (earnings surprisest-1), the 
length of presentations (log(total words)), firm size (log(market equity)), the ratio of book equity to market equity at the 
end of the preceding quarter (book-to-market), the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast in the most recent 
time period prior to the conference (forecast dispersiont-1), analysts’ revision of earnings forecast immediately 
following the conference as compared to earnings forecasts reported prior to the conference (forecast revisionst+1), the 
fraction of the firm’s total assets that are intangible (intangible assets), firms’ profitability in the most recent quarter 
prior to the conference (profitabilityt-1), and the amount of changes in firms’ sales from one quarters preceding the 
conference to the current quarter (sale growth). Year dummies are also included as controls (year fixed effects). 
Standard errors clustered by industry sectors are presented in parentheses. **, * , +: significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
level, respectively in a two-tailed test. 
  Future Profitability Future Earnings Surprises 
  (1) (2) 
Feeling words 49.855 1.118 
 
(29.088) (2.104) 
Net positive words 6.348 -0.082 
 (4.042) (0.389) 
Earnings surprisest-1 -1.780* 1.505** 
 (0.720) (0.387) 
Log (Total words) -0.074 -0.002 
 
(0.049) (0.006) 
Log(Market equity) -0.391+ -0.014 
 
(0.189) (0.015) 
Book-to-market 0.514 0.053 
 
(0.552) (0.036) 
Forecast dispersiont-1 -0.353 0.105 
 
(3.299) (0.774) 
Intangible assets 1.641 -0.077 
 
(1.095) (0.051) 
Profitabilityt-1 -0.041** 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 




  Firm Y Y 
Year Y Y 
Constant 5.731+ 0.230 
 
(2.660) (0.300) 
Observations 4,433 4,318 
R-squared 0.006 0.058 








The Association between Executives’ Use of Feeling Statements and Long-term Stock 
Returns and Analysts’ Reactions 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between the fractions of feeling words 
(feeling words) in executive presentations and firms’ future cumulative stock returns between 1 day and 30 days after 
the conference (CAR(1,30)) and analysts’ revision of earnings forecast immediately following the conference as 
compared to earnings forecasts reported prior to the conference (forecast revisionst+1). The key independent variable is 
feeling words, the fractions of total words in an executive’s speech that refer to his or her feelings. The key control 
variable is the fractions of financial positive words minus financial negative words in a presentation (net positive 
words). Each regressions also includes a number of other control variables, such as the length of presentations 
(log(total words)), firm size (log(market equity)), the ratio of book equity to market equity at the end of the preceding 
quarter (book-to-market), the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast in the most recent time period prior to 
the conference (forecast dispersiont-1), the fraction of the firm’s total assets that are intangible (intangible assets), 
firms’ profitability in the most recent quarter prior to the conference (profitabilityt-1), the amount of changes in firms’ 
sales from one quarters preceding the conference to the current quarter (sale growth), and the differences between most 
recently reported firms’ earnings and analysts’ earnings forecast prior to the conference (earnings surprisest-1). Year 
dummies are also included as controls (year fixed effects). Standard errors clustered by industry sectors are presented in 
parentheses. **, * , +: significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively in a two-tailed test. 
  CAR(1,30) CAR(1,30) Forecast Revisionst+1 Forecast Revisions t+1 











Net positive words 0.915* 0.960* -0.489 -0.494 
 (0.330) (0.334) (0.400) (0.401) 
Log (Total words) 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Log (Market equity) -0.088* -0.090* 0.023** 0.024** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.006) (0.006) 
Book-to-market 0.127* 0.122* -0.032 -0.029 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.022) (0.023) 
Forecast dispersiont-1 0.368 0.198 2.104+ 2.205+ 
 (0.672) (0.567) (1.101) (1.081) 
Intangible assets -0.040 -0.040 0.012 0.011 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.014) 
Profitability t-1 -0.001* -0.001* 
  
 (0.000) (0.000) 






Sales growth 0.034* 0.036* 0.113** 0.111** 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.031) (0.032) 
Fixed Effects 
    Firm Y Y Y Y 
Year Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.238* 1.273* -0.374* -0.397* 
 
(0.413) (0.411) (0.133) (0.119) 
     Observations 4,377 4,324 4,385 4,332 
R-squared 0.106 0.106 0.087 0.087 
Number of firms 713 694 714 695 












In this study, I consider how the extent to which an executive’s language is 
concrete and realism-based can influence investors’ evaluations of a firm. Specifically, 
drawing on market signaling theory, I hypothesize and find that executives’ use of 
realism—choices that are structured by the conditions of the firm—can signal firm value 
to investors. I also extend the theory to consider the substitution relationship between a 
firm’s qualitative and quantitative signals of quality and thus hypothesize and find that 
the association between realism and investor response is strengthened when other 
quantitative signals of firm value are less informative. While language is often viewed as 
a tool free for all to use, this study presents new evidence suggesting that the use of a 
certain type of language (e.g., realism) is not free for all to use, and in the financial 
setting, it may convey useful information about a firm’s quality to investors and analysts 






The job of running a public company is harder than ever in today’s hypercritical 
and overly scrutinized environment. In addition to monitoring day-to-day operations, 
executives devote a significant amount of time and energy to ensuring that external 
constituents understand and are satisfied with the direction that the company is going and 
the decisions being made (Jackson, 2007). For example, JoAnn Reed, the chief financial 
officer of Medco Health Solutions, one of America’s Most Shareholder-Friendly 
Companies, said that approximately 25% of her time is spent on informing and 
communicating with the capital market (Reed, as cited in Jackson, 2007). Evidence 
suggests that executives’ efforts to communicate and reach out to external constituents 
hold important implications for organizational performance. 
Despite the importance of executives’ efforts to communicate with external 
constituents, almost no scholarly attention has been given to whether and how executive 
word choice can act as a signal of unobserved firm quality to inform and influence 
investors. Although scholars have examined how executives and their behavior can act as 
signals and convey firm quality to critical external constituents, much of this research has 
focused on demographic characteristics of top executives (e.g., Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 
2001; Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 2007; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; 
Zhang & Wiersema, 2009). An instrumental task of upper management is to help critical 
external constituents understand what is occurring inside the organization, to create 
meaning, and to generate and sustain support for the organization (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; O’Connor, 2004; Pfeffer, 1981). As such, executives 




To begin answering these questions, I use computerized content analysis to 
quantify language used by executives in their presentations and to examine whether, how, 
and when executives’ word choices, such as the use of realism, influence investors’ 
valuation of a firm. The use of “realism” captures language that refers to “tangible, 
immediate, and practical issues” (Bligh, Kohles, & Meindl, 2004; Hart, 1984: 16; Hart & 
Carroll, 2010; Seyranian & Bligh, 2008). In other words, the use of realism captures the 
description of when, where, who, and what. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I theorized 
and examined the effect of emotional messages on investor reaction. While Chapter 2 
focused on how emotional messages not systematically linked to firm fundamental value 
can be used as a strategic tool to influence investor evaluation due to their effect on 
persuasion, this study focuses on how the use of realism words can be interpreted as a 
signal of unobserved firm quality by outside investors because the concrete details 
provided when discussing an object or event depends on a person’s psychological 
distance from the object or event. In other words, these two chapters emphasized two 
different paths for language to influence investors. 
Research on market signaling theory (see Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 
2011 for a review; Kirmani & Rao, 2000; Ross, 1977; Spence, 1973) suggests that 
information that is observable and costly to imitate can be used to signal possession of a 
positive attribute (e.g., Bird & Smith, 2005; Spence, 1973). In addition, research in 
psychology has long recognized that word use reflects a person’s psychological state and 
provides valuable information about his or her knowledge and interpretation of an event 
or activity (e.g., Eckert, 2000; Giles & Wiemann, 1993; Lakoff, 1987; Pennebaker & 




words may be interpreted as a signal of a firm’s value if executives face differential costs 
to use them.  
This paper focuses on realism because executives face different costs of using 
realism depending on the organizational reality that executives face and the knowledge 
and experience level they have concerning current and future events in the firm. 
Furthermore, I extend prior research by exploring the boundary conditions of executives’ 
word choice and investigating how the strength of other quantitative valuation signals 
will moderate the effect of language signals on investor response. I argue that because 
quantitative and qualitative signals are used jointly by investors to make investment 
decisions, investors may be more sensitive to differences in executives’ styles when the 
quantitative signal is less informative. As a result, the impact of executives’ use of 
realism on stock market reaction will be amplified when quantitative signals are less 
informative.  
Despite the regularity with which executives communicate with external 
constituents, very few studies have investigated systematically how executives’ choice of 
words in their verbal communication influences firms’ market performance. Thus, this 
study contributes to the strategy literature on the influence of language and executive 
behavior both empirically and theoretically. Scholars have long recognized the need to 
understand the biases, dispositions, and behaviors of top executives in order to 
understand organizations’ behavior and performance (Finkelstein et al., 1996; Hambrick, 
2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Although important insights have been gained from 
prior research regarding how the background, characteristics, and past affiliations of the 




IPO outcome (Certo, 2003; Certo et al., 2001; Chen, Hambrick, & Pollock, 2008; Cohen 
& Dean, 2005; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 
2006; Lester et al., 2005; Miller & Triana, 2009; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), and how top 
executives’ behavior (e.g., increasing ownership stakes in the firm) can signal to capital 
markets that the strategies they have chosen are in the owners’ best interests (Goranova et 
al., 2007), little is known about the implication of executives’ word choice on external 
constituents’ evaluation of a firm. Borrowing insights from market signaling theory and 
psychology research, I provide a theory of why, how, and when executives’ use of 
realism can influence investors’ evaluation of the firm. 
Moreover, while the importance of language in an organizational setting has long 
been recognized (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; O’Connor, 2004; 
Pfeffer, 1981), large-scale empirical examinations of language effect in organizations 
remain scant (see Martens et al., 2007 for a notable exception). More importantly, our 
knowledge remains limited regarding the specific types of language that will matter and 
under what conditions it will matter. This paper contributes to the strategy research by 
empirically demonstrating the signaling value of realism words and the amplified effect 
of realism signals when uncertainty associated with firms’ earnings is high.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Investors of public firms are outsiders who cannot observe firm daily operations, 
and thus, they only have incomplete and ambiguous information regarding firm future 
value and face uncertainty in their investment decisions. Top executives of public firms, 
on the other hand, are responsible for their organizations’ day-to-day operations and are 




superior information about the real quality and future prospects of a firm (Benabou & 
Laroque, 1992). In this situation, the imbalance of information between investors and 
executives arises in two main areas: information about the quality of the firm and 
information about the intent of the management (Stiglitz, 2000). When information 
asymmetry exists between investors and executives, investors may watch executives’ 
behavior and language closely for signals conveying firms’ future value. The signaling 
theory in economics is fundamentally concerned with actions that can be taken to reduce 
information asymmetry between two parties (Spence, 1973). For example, Spence’s 
(1973) seminal work demonstrated that when information asymmetry occurs between job 
applicants and potential employers regarding the real quality of the applicants, high-
quality applicants can use rigorous education profiles as a costly signal to distinguish 
themselves from low-quality applicants.  
Signaling theory suggests that two conditions need to be satisfied for a piece of 
information to qualify as a signal. First, the information must be observable to outsiders. 
If actions taken by insiders are not readily observable by outsiders, it is difficult to use 
those actions to communicate positive attribute to outsiders. Second, the cost of obtaining 
that piece of information must be high. In this theory, the term “cost” is used in a broad 
sense to refer to monetary and psychological costs, as well as the cost of time. If the cost 
of obtaining a signal is the same for all market participants, the signal cannot effectively 
differentiate participants with higher quality from those with inferior quality. For 
example, wearing a red hat to a job interview cannot be used as a signal to differentiate 
high and low quality applicants because both groups can have easy access to a red hat. If, 




thereby discouraging their attainment of such signal, it can act as a signal of positive 
attributes. For example, obtaining a higher education degree from a highly prestigious 
university is not only time-consuming but also extremely difficult for applicants with low 
quality given the high demand of the coursework at these institutions. As a result, fewer, 
if any, job applicants with lower quality will be able to obtain such a signal of quality. 
Thus, according to the market signaling theory, any action or piece of information that is 
both observable to outsiders and costly to obtain can act as a signal of unobserved 
quality. 
The information asymmetry between corporate executives and outside investors is 
similar to what prospective employers face during recruitment. While investors lack 
complete information about a firm’s quality, they must evaluate the quality and value of a 
firm to make investment decisions. Hence, investors’ tendency to respond to signals of 
quality is well documented (e.g., Chen et al., 2008; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hallen, 
2008; Rao, 1994). For instance, prestigious organizations (e.g., prominent venture capital 
firms) are known to be highly selective with regard to their partners; thus, it is hard for 
firms with low quality to establish a relationship with these prestigious organizations. As 
a result, Gulati and Higgins (2003) show that investors respond more favorably to young 
biotechnology firms that had established ties to prominent venture capital firms during 
their initial public offering.  
Although economic performance is often used as a quantitative signal of firms’ 
future value, it is not the only basis on which investors evaluate a firm. In addition, in 
many cases, quantitative signals are only noisy indicators of a firm’s future performance 




Research in strategy, finance, and accounting has documented that substantial movement 
in a firm’s stock prices seems to correspond to qualitative measures of managerial 
language, such as the tenor of disclosure (e.g., Feldman et al., 2010b; Loughran & 
McDonald, 2009; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008), the quality of logical arguments 
presented in texts (Martens et al., 2007), the use of vivid language in media reports 
(Hales, Kuang, & Venkataraman, 2011b), and the level of optimism expressed by 
executives in earnings conference calls (Demers & Vega, 2008). Moreover, the 
increasing number of investment managers who use linguistic algorithms to read and 
code the language used in company press releases to inform their trading decisions and 
recommendations also highlights the importance of language information in financial 
settings (Economist, 2007). Together, prior research suggests that besides economic 
performance, executives’ language use might provide novel information to investors 
beyond performance data.   
The Signaling Role of Realism 
Research in psychology has long shown that the way people use words conveys a 
great deal of information about them, such as their psychological, social, and physical 
states, and the situations they are in (e.g., Freud, 1938; Lacan & Wilden, 1968; 
Pennebaker et al., 2003). Language provides the audience information about the 
speakers’ differences in sex, social class, life experience, or basic personality 
(Pennebaker et al., 2003). Therefore, some see it as “a window into the narrator’s world” 
(Pennebaker & Stone, 2003: 291). Realism language is the use of language to describe 




objects and/or persons (Hart, 1984; Hart & Carroll, 2010). It entails the description of 
when, where, who, and what.  
The Construal Level Theory (CLT) is a theory in social psychology that describes 
the relation between psychological distance and the extent to which a person’s thinking 
(e.g., about objects and/or events) is abstract or concrete (Trope & Liberman, 2003). The 
basic premise of CLT is that an event or activity that is less psychologically distant from 
the speaker will be represented and portrayed at a higher level of concreteness; whereas, 
the more distant an object or event is from the individual, the more abstract it will be 
thought of or described (Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). 
Specifically, according to CLT, any event or activity can be construed in an individual’s 
mind abstractly or concretely (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Abstract construals are 
“general, inclusive, superordinate, and decontextualized representations” that focus on 
the general purpose of an event or activity and emphasize why a person engages in such 
behavior. Concrete construals, on the other hand, are specific, detailed, and contextual 
representations that emphasize how a person engages in a particular event or activity 
(Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 
1987). Consider, for example, a company creating an advertising campaign to increase 
brand recognition. A concrete construal of this activity might include details such as the 
number of stores involved, the consumer feedback collected, and the overall market 
reaction. In contrast, an abstract construal of this activity might be “making efforts to 
increase revenue,” which disregards the unique features of the event and focuses only on 




Psychologically distant things are those that are not present in a person’s direct 
experience of reality (Trope et al., 2007). For instance, an event may belong to the past or 
to the future (e.g., the opening of the first store several years back, the merger that will 
happen in the future), to spatially remote locations (e.g., in other international markets), 
to other people (e.g., how other competitors may perceive the current economic 
situation), and to hypothetical alternatives about what could or might have been but was 
never implemented (e.g., had the company entered another related product market). 
Therefore, CLT suggests that for an event or activity that occurs here and now and is 
therefore psychologically close, people tend to have more information and think of it and 
talk about it with more concrete and tangible language that makes use of rich and 
contextualized details. However, as an event is further removed from direct experience, 
people have less information about it, leading to the formation of a more abstract 
representation and description of the event or activity.  
This connection between people’s mental representation of an event and the way 
they will think about and describe it suggests that one’s ability to use realism language to 
describe something in concrete details is closely related to whether an object or event is 
in the person’s direct experience of reality. In other words, it depends on the person’s 
knowledge and experience with the event or activity. For people who lack sufficient 
knowledge and experience, speaking with concrete details and in realism language may 
be difficult and, therefore, entail substantial costs. Perhaps the individual has to spend a 
significant amount of time to obtain the knowledge and/or experiences in order to provide 
a realism-based description, or the person has to lie about the specifics and bear the risk 




knowledge and experience, but it is almost free to use for those who truly possess such 
knowledge and experience.  
In the case of corporate communication, this theory suggests that an executive’s 
use of realism language (or not) to discuss an object or event in concrete details can 
convey important information to investors regarding the executive’s possession of (or 
lack of) knowledge and experiences concerning an event. Recall the example of an 
advertising campaign discussed earlier. For instance, one executive might only tell the 
investors that the company has responded to a decreasing demand of their product by 
creating numerous advertising campaigns to increase brand recognition without referring 
to any specific details; another executive might talk about concrete details, such as the 
number of stores that conducted the advertising campaigns, the consumer feedback 
collected, and the overall market reaction. Would investors perceive these two executives 
differently? Prior research suggests that the use of more realism-based and concrete 
language may help executives convey a sense of competence and expertise. First, the 
description of goals and activities in more concrete terms directs the audience’s attention 
toward the feasible aspects of the goal or activity, thereby demonstrating the 
communicator’s detailed knowledge on how to accomplish the goal. Thus, the description 
of details will make the goal accomplishment seem more likely than if it were described 
in abstract language; in addition, this method makes the communicator appear more 
competent (Lasane, Cramer, & Breymaier, 1999; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1987; Zhao, Hoeffler, & Zauberman). 
Given that the provision of concrete details can help a speaker convey a sense of 




all and closely connected to an individual’s psychological distance from the object or 
event, I argue that executives’ use of realism words would convey information to 
investors regarding the executive and his or her firm’s underlying quality beyond 
performance results, and it will be interpreted as a signal of quality. Stated formally: 




Of course, language is not the only means available to signal a firm’s underlying 
quality to investors. In addition to qualitative language signals, executives of public firms 
have many other quantitative signals (e.g., accounting performance) to convey their 
future profitability to the investment community. When investors have multiple signals in 
hand, the use of one particular type of signal would depend on how useful the other 
signals are. Thus, in this section, I take a step further and argue that investors’ attention 
to, and therefore response to, executives’ qualitative language signal will depend on how 
informative other quantitative signals are, or the amount of uncertainty associated with a 
firm’s future earnings. 
From investors’ perspective, organizations differ greatly in the level of 
uncertainty associated with their underlying value. In general, this difference in 
uncertainty is caused by two factors. First, due to the nature of their businesses, some 
organizations are inherently harder to assess and therefore more uncertain than others are 
(Johnson, 2004) . Organizations with harder to predict business will experience higher 
levels of uncertainty in their valuation. For example, organizations in the emerging high 
technology sectors are much more difficult to value than organizations in traditional 




most of the relevant information for the investment community, and they vary in the 
quantity and quality of information they choose to disclose, a higher level of uncertainty 
will be associated with organizations that disclose less information that is more 
ambiguous. More importantly, because the nature of business for an organization does 
not change frequently, changes in a firm’s uncertainty level in the short term is more 
related to the management’s information disclosure. When publicly available quantitative 
signals of firms’ future profitability are highly noisy, the level of uncertainty associated 
with firms’ future earnings becomes high.  
Investors attend conferences because they want information to make better-
informed investment decisions. This is particularly the case if other quantitative valuation 
signals are less informative and the uncertainty about firm future profitability is high. For 
example, Barron, Kin, Lim and Stevens (1998) found that higher earning uncertainty is 
directly linked to a recognized need by investors and analysts to acquire further 
information before the next earnings release. Therefore, I argue that a higher level of 
uncertainty is likely to direct more investor attention and scrutiny to qualitative signals, 
such as managerial language, which may provide clues about a firm’s situation and 
performance. State formally: 
H2: The influence of executives’ use of realism will be amplified when the 
firm’s earnings uncertainty is high. 
 
In this paper, I assume that investors are likely rational information processors 
who are interested in reducing uncertainty and information asymmetry, and therefore, 
they will use all potential signals of firm value, including executive word choices. This 
perspective helps explain why investors who were asked to name the companies that they 




help investors understand how the company is doing and what its prospects are (Jackson, 
2007). 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data 
To test the hypotheses, I obtain stock returns, trading volume, capitalization, 
book-to-market ratio from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database 
and firm characteristics from Compustat database. Security analysts’ forecasts were 
obtained from I/B/E/S analyst forecasts. Using the Thomson Reuters StreetEvent 
services, I obtained 8,990 verbatim transcripts of executives’ presentations from 844 US 
public firms in 23 industries between 2003 and 2010. However, 1,516 observations has to 
be removed because Thomson Reuters does not have a record of the presentation and 
only provides Questions and Answers (Q&A) session. I further removed 353 duplicate 
observations because either a small part of the presentation was mistakenly coded as a 
separate presentation and thus resulted in duplicate copies, or because two identical 
presentations were captured by Thomson Reuters twice (e.g., same conference, same 
date, same speaker, and same word count). More importantly, I removed duplicate 
observations of same firm with multiple presentations on the same day as a result of 
different executives presenting at multiple conferences on the same day. The confounding 
effect caused by these same-day presentations is hard to disentangle, so I eliminated them 
from the analysis. I next removed 1,305 observations for which the absence of data on 
CRSP, Compustat, or I/B/E/S prevents the construction of variables needed for the 
empirical tests. Finally, some firms attended more than one conference each quarter, 




presentation in any quarter. Thus, the final sample consists of 4,324 observations of 
presentation transcripts for 694 firms in 23 industries.  
Descriptive information for the sample is presented in Table 3.1. Panel A shows 
the composition of the industries in the sample. Panel B shows the compositions of 
executives’ positions in their organizations to give you a sense of who are they. Panel C 
is a list of the top 15 conference organizers to provide you an idea of the types of 
conferences used for this study.  On average, firms in this sample have a return on assets 
of -0.71% (median 0.97%) and total asset of $20.6 billion (median: $4.5 billion) (see 
Table 3.3). The mean market value of equity of firms is $12.53 billion (median: $3.3 
billion). Thus, this sample consists of predominantly large public US firms. 
I examine the influence of realism in the context of managerial presentations at 
investment bank conferences. Investment bank conference is a prevalent form of 
voluntary and proactive communication between corporate leaders and outsiders (Bushee 
et al., 2011). Although investors and analysts have access to earnings data that can help 
them assess the fundamental value of a firm, they attend conferences because managerial 
presentations provide them the opportunities to supplement their private information 
about the firm with verbal and nonverbal information cues through interactions with 
executives. Compared to earnings calls, conference presentations are not designed strictly 
for the purpose of explaining past earnings and therefore give executives the opportunity 
to explain the firms’ overall “story” without having to focus only on explaining recent 
information event. It is also one of the few contexts in which I can observe verbatim 
transcripts of executives’ speech without worrying too much about the authorship of the 




annual reports and earnings announcements, one of the main criticisms of that literature is 
that language used in these reports may not be the language of executives but rather of 
those who were hired to deliver legally defensible public statements for the firm (e.g. 
public relations staff and lawyers). This is less of a concern in the case of conference 
presentations because these presentations are about an hour long consisting of more than 
6,000 words. Even if executives receive guidelines from their lawyers and public 
relations staff on what to say and not to say, observation of managerial presentations at 
investor conferences suggests that managers are typically speaking from notes but not 
reading word-by-word from a script.  
Event study 
To examine the immediate investor reactions to executives’ use of realism, I 
performed an event study. Event study methodology has been widely used in finance, 
accounting, and economics to study the stock price reactions to events since the early 
1980s (Binder, 1998; Brown & Warner, 1985). Strategy scholars have also employed this 
method to understand how investors react to various firm behavior and decisions (e.g., 
Lee & James, 2007; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). 
This method allows researchers to determine if an event or information release at an 
event is significant by evaluating the abnormal price change of a firm’s stock. If investors 
perceive that executives’ use of realism words as conveying new information about firm 
value, one would expect changes in the firm’s stock returns following the presentation. In 
addition, it is well-known that often decision-makers do not realize the influence of 




provides a less obtrusive way to examine investor behavior than methods that ask 
investors directly how they would react to differences in executive language style.  
Dependent Variables 
Abnormal stock return. Abnormal stock return is the difference between a 
firm’s expected returns and its observed return. The association between the use of 
certain type of words and any abnormal increase or decrease in a firm’s stock returns the 
next day indicates the extent to which the event provided new information about the 
value of firm (Brown & Warner, 1985). Using the EVENTUS program available on 
Wharton Research Data Services, I calculated expected returns based on the OLS market 
model. The OLS market model predicts a firm’s expected return using regression analysis 
that relates a firm’s return to that of a market portfolio (in this case, the NYSE and NSDQ 
equally weighted index). Using daily returns, I estimated a regression equation for each 
firm based on its relationship with a market portfolio over the estimation period (ending 
45 days before the conference and extending back to 255 days prior to the conference). 
The estimation period ends 45 days before the event of interest so that returns at the time 
of the event will not influence the model parameters. I then used the resulting regression 
coefficients to calculate a firm’s expected return and subtract this expected return from a 
firm’s observed return to compute abnormal returns for each firm for the event window, 
which is on the day of the conference and one day after the conference. The OLS market 
model has shown to be well specified under a variety of conditions (Brown & Warner, 
1985). Also, given the fact that investors and the media are unlikely to report word-by-
word executives’ speech after the presentation, the likelihood that executives’ use of 





Quantitative approach to text analysis has gained increasing popularity over the 
past decade (e.g., Pennebaker et al., 2003; Popping, 2000; West, 2001). Two main 
methods have been used in prior research to quantify the language in text, which are the 
judge-based content analysis approach and the word count approach. The judge-based 
approach involves human judges who identify the presence of critical thematic references 
in texts on the basis of empirically or theoretically developed coding systems (Smith, 
1992). The word count approach, on the other hand, use computerized content analysis 
program to count the number of words in a text document that belongs to a pre-defined 
category of words. While both the judge-based and word count approaches provide valid 
count of the information in a text, because the word count approach does not involve 
subjective human judgment, the resulting word count measures are considered to be 
“parsimonious, objective, replicable, and transparent ” (Pennebaker et al., 2003; Tetlock 
et al., 2008: 1440). Therefore, this paper adopted the word count approach and reply on 
word dictionaries that was developed through extensive psychological research to 
quantify the use of realism words in executives’ presentation.  
Realism. This variable refers to “language describing tangible, immediate, 
recognizable matters that affect people’s everyday lives” (Hart, 2002: 38) . It is 
calculated as the percentage of total words that are realism-based, using a computerized 
content analysis program called Diction 6.0 (Hart & Carroll, 2010). Diction 6.0, 
developed by Rodrick Hart and Craig Carroll, is a scientific method for determining the 
tone of a verbal message using a computer program that searches a passage for thirty-five 




realism-based. It has been used widely in the field of communications, political science, 
marketing, and finance to analyze presidential speeches, political advertising, public 
debates, media coverage, and managerial language (e.g., Bligh & Hess, 2007; Demers & 
Vega, 2008; Ober, Zhao, Davis, & Alexander, 1999; Yadav, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2007; 
Yuthas, Rogers, & Dillard, 2002). According to Hart and Carroll (2010: 7), below is the 
formula for calculating this variable: 
Realism = [Spatial Awareness + Temporal Awareness + Present Concern + 
Human Interest + Concreteness + Familiarity] – [Past Concern + Complexity]  
 
Spatial Awareness refers to geographical entities, physical distance, and modes of 
measurement. Temporal Awareness refers to terms that fix a person, idea, or event within 
a specific time-interval. Present Concern refers to present-tense verbs. Human Interest 
refers to words that concentrate on human beings and their activities, which gives a text a 
life-like quality. Concreteness refers to words that indicate tangibility and materiality. 
Included in concreteness category are sociological units (e.g., peasants, African-
Americans, Catholics), occupational groups (e.g., carpenter, manufacturer, 
policewoman), and political alignments (e.g., Communists, congressman, Europeans); 
Also incorporated are physical structures (e.g., courthouse, temple, store), forms of 
diversion (e.g., television, football, CD-ROM), terms of accountancy (e.g., mortgage, 
wages, finances), and modes of transportation (e.g., airplane, ship, bicycle). In addition, 
the dictionary includes body parts (e.g., stomach, eyes, lips), articles of clothing (e.g., 
slacks, pants, shirt), household animals (e.g., cat, insects, horse) and foodstuffs (e.g., 
wine, grain, sugar), and general elements of nature (e.g., oil, silk, sand). Familiarity 
consists of a selected number of C.K. Ogden s (1968) operation words, which he 




prepositions (across, over, through), demonstrative pronouns (this, that) and interrogative 
pronouns (who, what), and a variety of particles, conjunctions and connectives (a, for, 
so). Past Concern refers to past-tense forms of the verbs contained in the Present 
Concern dictionary. Complexity is a simple measure of the average number of characters-
per-word in a given input file.  
Uncertainty. Security analysts are known to conduct extensive analysis of 
publicly available information about a firm when making earnings forecasts and 
recommendations. When publicly available valuation signals of a firm’s future 
profitability are highly noisy, analysts face a higher level of uncertainty when making 
their forecast. As a result, there will be a lack of consensus among security analysts about 
a firm’s future events and earnings (e.g., Barron, Kim, Lim, & Stevens, 1998; Barry & 
Jennings, 1992; Johnsons, 2004) (e.g., Barron et al., 1998; Barry & Jennings, 1992; 
Johnson, 2004). Hence, research in finance has shown that the amount of variations and 
disagreements across analysts in their assessment of a firm’s future earnings is a good 
proxy for the level of uncertainty associated with a firm and the noise level of a firm’s 
other quantitative valuation signals (Johnson, 2004). Therefore, I use the dispersion of 
security analysts’ forecasts, measured by calculating the standard deviation of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts in the most recent reported forecast prior to the conference, as a proxy 
for the amount of uncertainty associated with a firm’s earnings. 
Controls. I also included a number of control variables to control for some 
alternative explanations. First of all, I control for the underlying financial tone of the 
presentation. One potential explanations of the result is that investors are reacting to the 




firm’s current situation. To control for this alternative explanation, I calculated a measure 
of financial tone (net positive words) by subtracting the fraction of total words that are 
financially negative from the fraction of words that are financially positive.  
Net positive words = 
                       
          
 – 
                       
          
 
 
I used the dictionary of financial negative and positive words developed by Loughran and 
McDonald (2009). Although several prior studies have used the Harvard IV-4 dictionary 
to measure negative and positive words (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008), word 
list, such as the Harvard-IV-4 dictionary, developed for psychology and sociology may 
not translate well into the realm of financial settings (2009). Specifically, some negative 
words in the Harvard dictionary do not have a truly negative meaning in the context of 
financial markets, such as tax, cost, liabilities, and simply describe company operations 
and thus will be misclassified and add noise to the measurement of underlying financial 
tone. Therefore, given that the setting of this paper is financial disclosure, I used the 
alternative word list developed by Loughran and McDonald (2009) to better reflect the 
tenor of financial text. 
Another potential explanation for the results is that executives might have 
released substantial good or bad information regarding a firm’s fundamental, which in 
turn caused the stock market reaction to be positive or negative. If this is the case, I 
would expect security analysts to revise their earnings forecast after the conference. Thus, 
I also control for whether security analysts made a forecast revision after the conference. 
Using analysts forecast of sales revenue provided by IBES, I calculated the percentage of 




the conference as compared to the last reported forecast before the conference (forecast 
revisions).  
Forecast Revisions = 
    -                    -    -                   
   -                    
 
 
Post conference forecast is the most recently announced earnings forecast after the 
conference. Pre-conference forecast is the most recently announced earnings forecast 
before the conference. Thirdly, some may argue that the performance of the firm before 
the conference will be an important driver of investor reaction. An important criterion 
that investors use to judge the performance of a firm is whether the firm has performed 
up to expectations (e.g., Burgstahler & Eames, 2006; Kinney, Burgstahler, & Martin, 
2002b). Therefore, I control for the difference between a firm’s most recently announced 
earnings and the analysts’ consensus earnings forecast for the firm prior to the conference 
(earnings surprisest-1). This variable captures whether and how much a firm has 
performance as compared to analysts’ expectations. To control for firm size, I measure a 
firm’s total market capitalization (log(market equity)) at the end of preceding quarter 
prior to the conference. To control for the type of security, I included the log of a firm’s 
book-to-market ratio (book-to-market)) at the end of preceding quarter prior to the 
conference. Research shows that firms with high book-to-market equity have persistently 
low earnings, higher financial leverage, low sales growth, more earnings uncertainty, and 
are more likely to cut dividends compared to their low BE/ME counterparts (Chen & 
Zhang, 1998; Fama & French, 1995; Griffin & Lemmon, 2002). I also control for the 
total amount of words (log(total words)) in each presentation because in many cases, the 




(Shelby & Reinsch Jr, 1995). Finally, I included a set of year dummies to control the 
effect of time. 
Analysis 
 Because the data extended over seven years and there are multiple observations 
for each firm, these observations were not independent and therefore were not 
appropriate for analysis with a simple ordinary least square regression. Thus, I used a 
firm fixed-effect model to control for constant unmeasured differences across firms that 
may explain differences in the dependent variables. Fixed-effects models are considered 
conservative because only changes in independent variables within a firm can produce 
significant effects. Thus, a positive coefficient in these models can be interpreted as 
indicating that a positive change in an independent variable within a firm is associated 
with a positive change in the dependent variable within that firm.  
RESULTS 
To examine whether and how investors respond to executives’ use of realism, I 
examine contemporaneous stock reaction to the amount of realism that an executive use 
in his or her presentation. I report descriptive statistics and correlations in table 3.4 and 
key regression results in tables 3.5 and table 3.6. All models are estimated using firm 
fixed-effect regressions with standard errors clustered by industry sectors. First, results in 
table 3.5 and 3.6 show that most of the control variables are not significant at predicting 
abnormal stock returns following the conference. The insignificant results for most of the 
control variables except for earnings surprisest-1 and net positive words, is not surprising 
because the dependent variable is firm abnormal stock returns following investor 




firms’ release of accounting performance and thus most of the firm characteristics, such 
as firm size and book-to-market ratio, will not change from one conference to another. 
The earnings surprisest-1 is the differences between the most recently announced firms’ 
earnings and analysts forecast prior to the conference and therefore is more likely than 
other firm characteristics to vary from one conference to another. In addition, net positive 
words represent the extent to which executives used financial positive words in their 
presentations and thus more likely to vary across conferences.  
In table 3.5 model 2, I test Hypothesis 1. As predicted, realism had a significantly 
positive relationship with the abnormal stock returns predicted using the market model 
(coef. =0.006, p<0.05). To check the robustness of the results with regard to different 
measures of stock returns, I also tested the effect of realism on stock returns, calculated 
using the market-adjusted model. Consistent with the previous results, I also find a 
positive and significant relationship between realism and market-adjusted returns (Table 
3.5 Model 6: coef. =0.006, p<0.05). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported. It suggests that 
stock investors respond positively to the use of realism by executives in their conference 
presentations. In Hypothesis 2, I argued the moderating role of uncertainty on the 
relationship between realism and stock reaction. In table 6 model 2, I include the 
interaction term between realism and earnings uncertainty. I find that this term had a 
positive and significant association with market returns (coef. = 0.638, p<0.01). As 
shown in Figure 1, the impact of realism on stock returns is more pronounced when 
uncertainty is high. In contrast, the impact of realism is minimal when uncertainty is low. 
Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the positive relationship between realism and stock 




Since both Chapter 1 and 2 of this dissertation focus on executive word choice 
during conference presentation, it is important to show that the effect of realism is above 
and beyond the effect of feeling words identified in Chapter 1. In table 5 model 3 and 7, I 
tested the effect of realism on market returns and market-adjusted stock returns by 
controlling for executives’ use of feeling words. Results show that the effect of realism is 
not subsumed by the inclusion of feeling words, suggesting that realism words and 
feeling words each has their own independent effect on stock returns. 
As discussed in theory section related to the influence of realism, executives’ use 
of realism may be driven by their personal differences. To test for this alternative 
explanation, I obtained a representative subsample of 1,028 presentations and coded the 
individual speaker. I then tested the effect of realism using a firm-speaker fixed-effect 
regression in model 4 of table 3.5. This allows me to estimate how much of the variation 
in stock market response can be attributed to changes in realism, after controlling for firm 
fixed effects and individual executive fixed effects. In these models, only changes in 
realism within a firm-speaker pair can produce significant effects. Thus, a positive 
coefficient in these models can be interpreted as indicating that a positive change in 
realism within a matched firm and speaker pair is associated with a positive change in 
market response. As can been seen in table 3.5 model 3, realism had a positive and 
significant coefficient (coef. =0.061, p<0.05), implying that executives’ use of realism is 
empirically an important determinant of stock market reaction even if I control for firm 
and speaker fixed effect. Thus, I conclude that the result of Hypothesis 1 is robust against 
the alternative explanation that the impact of realism is driven by individual difference.  




knowledge and experience and thus allowing others to use it as a signal to infer the 
individual’s competency. If this is the case, I should observe three effects. First, I should 
observe a systematic relationship between executives’ use of realism and firms’ 
conditions. If I assume that most executives have a reasonable amount of knowledge to 
do his or her job, their variances in realism is likely to be related to the conditions of 
firms that may facilitate or prohibit them from providing concrete details to investors. For 
example, if a firm already has a proven business model, it would not be difficult for 
executives to be realism-based and to talk about the details of their model. However, if a 
firm is still in the process of forming a profitable business model and is still attracting 
investments based on its potential for growth, it is likely that executives are less capable 
of providing concrete details about their profit-generating activities. Thus, I expect 
executives’ use of realism to be connected to their firms’ conditions. In table 3.7, I tested 
the association between a firm’s characteristics on realism. Result shows that there is a 
significantly and positive association between a firm’s most recently announced 
profitability prior to the conference and executives’ use of realism, providing some 
support to the idea that firm conditions influence executives’ use of realism. However, it 
is also important to note that while prior profitability is a significant predictor of 
executive use of realism. Prior profitability is always controlled when I test the 
relationship between executives’ use of realism and stock returns, suggesting that prior 
profitability and other firm conditions do not explain entirely the variances in executive 
use of realism and realism has its independent impact on firm stock returns above and 
beyond these indicators of firm conditions.  




be interpreted as signal of a firm’s underlying quality, we should expect security analysts, 
the expert of firm valuation, to react to executives’ use of realism as well. In table 8, I use 
realism to predict analysts’ revisions of their earnings forecasts after the conference. As 
expected, I observe a positive and significant relationship between executives’ use of 
realism and analysts revisions (table 8 model 2: coef. =0.042, p<0.10). Since this 
relationship is only marginally significant, this only represents some initial evidence that 
analysts also respond to executives’ use of realism but further analyses are needed to 
reach a more definite conclusion.  
Third, if realism can be used as a signal of quality, I should expect it to be 
positively related to indicators of firm future performance. In table 9 and 10, I tested the 
effect of realism on firm future stock returns and profitability. While there is a marginally 
significant positive relationship between realism and firm future stock returns (β =0.022, 
p<0.10), I found no systematic relationship between executives’ use of realism and future 
profitability (see table 10 mode 2 and 4). Thus, there is mixed evidence regarding 
whether executives’ use of realism is predictive of firm future performance. 
DISCUSSION 
Organizational researchers have long emphasized the importance of language and 
narrative in managing the demands and expectations of key stakeholders (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Pfeffer, 1981). For example, Pfeffer (1981) stated that 
a key task of management is to use language and symbolic activities to help both internal 
and external organizational participants to make sense of what is going on in the 
organization, to create meanings, and to ensure commitment and support of 




executive language by investigating whether, how, and when executives’ use of realism 
will impact investors’ firm evaluation. The central premise of this study is that 
executives’ word choice is observable to outsiders and executives face differential costs 
to use realism. As a result, executives’ use of realism may be interpreted as signal of a 
firm’s future value to investors, thus influencing investors’ evaluation of the firm and 
price movements in the stock market.  
The results clearly demonstrate that differences in executives’ level of realism 
relate to investors’ reactions. I found that stock investors react positively to the use of 
realism. At a broad level, this is consistent with research that focuses on the role of 
managerial language in helping executives to manage external stakeholders’ perception 
of the firm (Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). The findings are also consistent with 
empirical studies in finance and accounting that demonstrated the connection between 
movements in firms’ stock returns and qualitative features of managerial language 
(Demers & Vega, 2008; Feldman et al., 2010b; Hales et al., 2011b; Loughran & 
McDonald, 2009; Tetlock et al., 2008). However, while these prior studies in finance and 
accounting have mostly focused on the tenor of managerial language, this paper’s focus 
on manager’s use of realism and thus identified another important characteristics of 
managerial language that influence external constituents’ evaluation of the firm. 
Moreover, this paper departed from prior studies by focusing on managerial presentations 
at conferences, a form of voluntary and direct face-to-face verbal communications 
between managers and investors. Most prior studies have focused either on written 
communications between management and investors (e.g., annual reports) or verbal 




managerial presentations at conferences are becoming an increasingly important 
communication mechanism between organizations and investors (Bushee et al., 2011). 
Investors use these opportunities to evaluate a firm above and beyond the information 
provided in earnings statements. Therefore, this paper contributes to the understanding of 
how to effectively communicate with external constituents at these important occasions.  
I also argued that the presence of high uncertainty would amplify the influence of 
executives’ use of realism on stock market reaction, because investors will put more 
emphasis on qualitative signals of future firm value when other quantitative signals are 
less informative. Specifically, I argued that when earnings number and analyst forecasts 
are unclear and create uncertainty, investors will be more sensitive to qualitative 
information, such as executives’ word choice to infer information about firm past and 
future activities and performances. Empirical results provide some support to this 
argument. I found that the effect of realism on stock returns is more pronounced when 
uncertainty is high. 
The findings in this study together have important implications for executives 
who communicate with investors regularly as well as investors who try to incorporate 
multiple sources of information to make investment decisions. For executives, this study 
provides evidence that investors perceive their use of realism words as signal of firm 
quality and respond to it. Hence, executives need to pay close attention to their use of 
realism words and utilize all available opportunities to demonstrate their competence and 
knowledge. For example, if executives use more abstract and not realism-based words 
when concrete details are in fact available is likely to invite unnecessary doubts regarding 




suggest that when there is a high level of uncertainty regarding firm future earnings, 
investors will demand more information and thus be more sensitive to qualitative features 
of executive language. Therefore, under such conditions, extra caution should be given to 
executives’ choice of words when communicating with investors. 
The approach in this study is not without its limitations. Future research can 
extend the current work by addressing some of these shortcomings. First, findings in this 
study may not generalize to many other contexts, such as initial public offerings. It is 
possible that if I had conducted the study using other written communication between 
executives and investors, such as annual reports or if I had conducted the study using IPO 
prospectuses, I might have found different results. The use of certain verbal styles might 
be more or less prevalent and noticeable in written format. Future research might advance 
the understanding in this area by addressing these alternative explanations and examining 
the effect of verbal styles in the setting of IPOs and compare and contrast the 
characteristics of managerial language used in written versus verbal communications and 
how investor responses vary depending on the communication mechanism.  
Second, the verbal styles examined in this study might be correlated with 
unobservable characteristics of the firm and the presenting executives. I have tried to 
limit the influence of firm characteristics on executives’ word use by testing hypotheses 
using a firm fixed-effect and firm-speaker fixed-effect model, and thus holding constant 
characteristics of firms and speakers. I also controlled for many conventional firm 
characteristics that have been identified in prior literature to influence stock market 




Third, the study of language only represents one of the many ways that an 
individual can convey value-related information in communication. Communication 
experts generally agree that beside verbal content, there are various nonverbal attributes 
(e.g., appearance, facial expression, and gestures) and vocal attributes (e.g., voice 
intonation, speed, and volume) that may provide information. For instance, Mayew and 
Venkatachalam (2012) have demonstrated that investors do incorporate managerial 
expression of emotional states via vocal cues (e.g., voice) into stock market prices. Thus, 
another fruitful avenue for future research might be to explore how nonverbal cues in 
conference presentations influence stock reaction. 
Fourth, the sample of firms included in this study are either firms who have been 
invited by Thomson Reuters to be covered in their StreetEvent service because of its 
major role in an industry or firms who were covered through the request of the firm or 
institutional investors to Thomson Reuters, thus represent a group of firms that are larger 
in size than average firm and in general a higher level of performance. As a result, this 
may limit the generalizability of the findings in this study to other smaller and less 







Panel A: Industry Composition 
 
IID # of Industries # of Companies # of Transcripts 
01 Aerospace & Defense 41 524 
02 Airlines 19 119 
03 Automobile 10 101 
04 Beverages 14 97 
05 Biotechnology 100+ 1446 
06 Communication Equipment 69 810 
07 Electric Utilities 21 311 
08 Electrical Equipment 41 253 
09 Electrical, Instruments, & Components 61 443 
10 Food & Staples Retailing 16 224 
11 Food Products 42 324 
12 Health Care Equipment & Supplies 100+ 1056 
13 Health Care Providers & Services NA 366 
14 Health Care Technology 14 80 
15 Household Durables 31 347 
16 Household Product 10 160 
17 Insurance 79 634 
18 Internet Retailing & Internet Software NA 267 
19 Metals & Mining 35 95 
20 Multiline Retail 15 173 
21 Multi-utilities 23 372 
22 Pharmaceuticals 89 775 
23 Water Utilities 2 13 
 
Total 632 8990 
 
Panel B. Corporate Positions of Key Presenters 
Presenter Position Number of Transcripts Percent of Sample 
CEO 776 60.63 
CFO 359 28.05 
Others 145 11.33 







Panel C:  Conference Organizers 
Top 15 Conference Organizers Frequency Percent of Sample 
JPMorgan 107 8.29 
Morgan Stanley 98 7.59 
Credit Suisse 85 6.58 
Bank of America 71 5.5 
Deutsche Bank Securities 69 5.34 
Cowen and Company 53 4.11 
Smith Barney Citigroup 51 3.95 
UBS 50 3.87 
Raymond James 49 3.8 
Goldman Sachs 46 3.56 
Barclays 31 2.4 
Thomas Weisel Partners 28 2.17 
Bear, Stearns & Co 27 2.09 
Merrill Lynch 27 2.09 
All Other Investment Banks Combined 459 9.91 
Industry Association 40 3.1 




Table 3.2 Example from the Transcripts 
 
Example of High Realism 
Becton, Dickinson, and Company 
Sep 10, 2007 
 
Outside the United States where conversion rates to safety devices are low, increased 
conversion will drive the growth. And inside the United States, enhanced products, future-
generation products, or upgrades, will drive the growth. The Push Button Blood Collection Set, 
shown on this slide, is a great example of a higher value, next-generation device that is driving 
growth. 
 
The added value of this product commands a price premium of nearly 75% over the previous-
generation product. Nexiva is another good example of a next-generation safety device designed 
to reduce the spread of infection. This closed IV-catheter system not only protects healthcare 
workers, it also adds another element, patient safety, by reducing the risk of contamination 
entering the bloodstream through the IV set. 
 
A complementary product to the IV catheter is the IV flush syringe, which is used to keep IV 
lines clean before and after the administration of medication. They also help protect patients by 
reducing the potential for contamination during the filling process and they aid clinicians by 
eliminating the need for needles. They are also easier to use which makes nurses more efficient. 
 
The developing world faces unique challenges to reduce the spread of infection as reuse of single 
devices is a major source of infectious disease transmission in this part of the world. BD has 
pioneered low cost, auto-disabled devices that prevent reuse. Our devices reduce the spread of 
infection by eliminating the ability to reuse injection devices. 
 
Honeywell International 
Sep 06, 2007 
 
Over time, we've really invested in the business; grown our automation and control business to 
about the same size as aerospace now. By taking the software we have installed in the business 
jets today and coupling that with our ground products database …, we can actually project on a 
HUD, a display, what is outside the cockpit when there is zero visibility. It has been recognized 







Example of Low Realism 
Mercury Computers Systems 
Jan 12, 2007 at 1:30pm 
 
So what do we do? We do basically what we have done for many, many years. We architect 
specialized computing solutions where the applications need something, the capability beyond 
that which can be provided by general-purpose computers. Typically what it means is that we 
find the latest semiconductor technology in the form of processors, microprocessors. You see a 
list of them there. The Cell processor from IBM, FBGAs, graphics processing units, GPUs, 
obviously general-purpose processors. 
 
We architect them into a heterogeneous solution which meets the specific application 
requirements of the industries you see over there on the right hand side. In order to do this we 
have a lot of expertise in the architecting of the computers and the detail knowledge of the chips 
themselves so that we can optimize the code that is running on these chips. We're not just a 
hardware Company by any means. We sell our solutions to the customers. That is why they come 
to us. 
 
A number of the companies that we are involved with here are the commercial companies on the 
left-hand side, defense companies on the right. The message to take away from here is that most 
of these are certainly Tier 1 companies, both in the defense space and the commercial world. 
 
Dr. Pepper 
Sep 09, 2009 
 
We believe that … through single-serve availability, award-winning innovation and 360 degree 
consumer communications we will ensure our brands are top of line and always close at hand. 
Over time our crush-cost mindset will ensure we manage the leanest and most-efficient operating 
model possible. Our guiding principal is to do what's best for our brands, our customers, our 











  Mean S.D. Median Min Max 
Return on Assets -0.009 0.130 0.010 -7.057 0.556 
Total Assets (billions) 20.603 63.304 4.462 0.017 1072.105 
Market Equity 4.242 12.534 26.370 0.006 230.610 









    Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Market returns 0.003 0.041 -0.538 0.458 
            
2 Market-adj. returns 0.003 0.041 -0.537 0.455 0.94 
           
3 CAR(1, 30) -0.002 0.15 -0.829 3.364 0.11 0.12 
          
4 Realism words 0.309 0.161 -0.049 0.500 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
         
5 Net positive words 0.008 0.007 -0.021 0.063 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.12 
        
6 Log(total words) 8.059 0.655 3.584 9.556 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 
       
7 Log(Market equity) 14.98 1.900 8.737 19.448 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 0.24 -0.02 
      
8 Book-to-market 0.535 0.433 -0.232 1.731 0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.10 -0.10 0.01 -0.12 
     
9 Uncertainty 0.005 0.022 0.000 0.527 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.10 0.02 -0.24 0.13 
    
10 Forecast revisions 0.016 0.231 -1.000 9.234 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 
   
11 Unexpected earnings 0.066 0.256 -0.614 0.938 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.18 0.09 0.08 0.15 
  
12 Profitabilityt+1 -0.009 0.13 -7.057 0.556 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0.10 -0.01 0.29 0.01 -0.10 0.02 -0.13 
 




Table 3.5  
The Association between Realism and Contemporaneous Stock Returns 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between the fractions of realism words 
(realism words) in executive presentations at investor conferences and firms’ cumulative abnormal stock return on the 
day of the conference and the day after. The two different dependent variables are the firm’s abnormal stock returns 
predicted using the market model (market return) and market-adjusted model (market-adj return). I used the market 
model with a [-255, -45] trading day estimation period relative to the day of conference as the benchmark for expected 
returns. The key independent variable is realism words, the fractions of total words in an executive’s speech that are 
concrete and realism-based. The key control variable is the fractions of financial positive words minus financial 
negative words in a presentation (net positive words) and the fraction of feeling words (feeling words). Each 
regressions also includes a number of other control variables, such as the length of presentations (log(total words)), 
firm size (log(market equity)), the ratio of book equity to market equity at the end of the preceding quarter (book-to-
market), the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast in the most recent time period prior to the conference 
(Uncertainty), the differences between most recently reported firms’ earnings and analysts’ earnings forecast prior to 
the conference (earnings surprisest-1),  and analysts’ revision of earnings forecast immediately following the 
conference as compared to earnings forecasts reported prior to the conference (forecast revisionst+1). Year dummies are 
also included as controls (year fixed effects). Standard errors clustered by industry sectors are presented in parentheses. 



















  (1) (2) (4) (3) (5) (6) (7) 
Realism words 
 
















Net positive words 0.354* 0.351* 0.031 0.343* 0.297+ 0.295+ 0.286+ 
 
(0.135) (0.133) (0.199) (0.131) (0.145) (0.144) (0.142) 
Log (Total words) -0.001 -0.001 -0.055 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.480) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log(Market equity) -0.004 -0.004 0.551 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.782) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Book-to-market 0.009 0.009 -0.000 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.012 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.225) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Uncertainty -0.055 -0.055 4.558 -0.011 -0.042 -0.042 0.032 
 
(0.104) (0.104) (10.459) (0.068) (0.152) (0.152) (0.080) 
Earnings surprisest-1 0.015** 0.015** -0.148 0.015** 0.016** 0.016** 0.015** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.151) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Forecast revisionst+1 -0.004 -0.004 4.194* -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (1.684) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Fixed Effects        
Year Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Firm Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Speaker   Y     
 
       
Constant 0.064 0.062 -11.936 0.063 0.033 0.031 0.024 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (12.910) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
        Observations 4,385 4,385 768 4,332 4,385 4,385 4,332 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.045 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.014 





Predicting Stock Returns Using the Interaction of Realism and Uncertainty 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between the interaction between fractions 
of realism words (realism words) and standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast in the most recent time period 
prior to the conference (Uncertainty), and firms’ cumulative abnormal stock return on the day of the conference and the 
day after. The two different dependent variables are the firm’s abnormal stock returns predicted using the market model 
(market return). I used the market model with a [-255, -45] trading day estimation period relative to the day of 
conference as the benchmark for expected returns. The key control variable is the fractions of realism words (realism 
words), standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast in the most recent time period prior to the conference 
(Uncertainty), and the fraction of financial positive words minus financial negative words in a presentation (net positive 
words). Each regressions also includes a number of other control variables, such as the length of presentations 
(log(total words)), firm size (log(market equity)), the ratio of book equity to market equity at the end of the preceding 
quarter (book-to-market), firms’ profitability in the most recent quarter prior to the conference (profitabilityt-1), and 
analysts’ revision of earnings forecast immediately following the conference as compared to earnings forecasts reported 
prior to the conference (forecast revisionst+1). Year dummies are also included as controls (year fixed effects). Standard 
errors clustered by industry sectors are presented in parentheses. **, * , +: significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively in a two-tailed test. 
  Market Returns Market Returns 






Realism 0.006* 0.005+ 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Uncertainty -0.055 -0.229* 
 
(0.104) (0.074) 
Net positive words 0.351* 0.348* 
 
(0.133) (0.134) 
Log(Total words) -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Log(Market Equity) -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Book-to-market 0.009 0.009 
 
(0.014) (0.014) 
Profitabilityt-1 0.015** 0.015** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Forecast Revisionst+1 -0.004 -0.005 
 
(0.006) (0.007) 
Fixed Effects   
Year Y Y 
Firm Y Y 
 
  
Constant 0.062 0.062 
 
(0.041) (0.041) 
   Observations 4,385 4,385 
R-squared 0.012 0.013 


















Economic Significance of Realism Words 
This table reports the economic significance of the effect of realism words (realism words), and the interactions 
between realism words and uncertainty (realism*uncertainty), on abnormal stock returns predicted using the market 
model (market return) and market-adjusted model (market-adj. return). Economic significance is defined as the 
product of the coefficient and standard deviation of the variable of interest. The coefficients used in this table are 
obtained from Table 3.5 and 3.6.  
Type of Message Standard Deviation Coefficient 
Economic 
Significance t-stat 
     Dependent Variable = Market Model Stock Returns 
Realism words 0.161 0.061 0.98% 2.10 
     Dependent Variable = Market-adjusted Model Stock Returns 
Realism words 0.161 0.006 0.10% 3.00 
     Dependent Variable = Market Model Stock Returns 
Realism*Uncertainty 0.009 0.638 0.57% 3.99 







The Associations between Firm Characteristics and Realism Words
3
 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between firm characteristics and the 
fractions of realism words (realism words) in executive presentations. The key independent variables are, firms’ 
profitability in the most recent quarter prior to the conference (profitabilityt-1), firm size (log(market equity)), firms’ 
ratio of book equity to market equity (book-to-market), and the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast in the 
most recent time period prior to the conference (forecast dispersiont-1). I control for the length of a presentation 
(log(total words)). Standard errors clustered by industry sectors are presented in parentheses. **, * , +: significant at 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively in a two-tailed test. 
  Realism Words 




Net positive words 0.799 
 
(0.647) 
Log(Total words) 0.006 
 
(0.012) 






















                                                 
3
 I would like to acknowledge the fact that the association between firm conditions and executive use of 
realism suggests that a two-stage least-square regression model (2SLS) might be more appropriate for 
testing the impact of executive use of realism on stock returns. It is not used in the current version of the 
paper because I am still in the process of collecting an exclusion variable that can act as instrument for the 





The Association between Realism and Analysts’ Forecast Revisions 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between the fractions of realism words 
(realism words) in executive presentations and analysts’ revision of earnings forecast immediately following the 
conference as compared to earnings forecasts reported prior to the conference (forecast revisionst+1). The key 
independent variable is realism words, the fractions of total words in an executive’s speech that refer to tangible, 
immediate, and practice issues and objects. The key control variable is the fractions of financial positive words minus 
financial negative words in a presentation (net positive words). Each regressions also includes a number of other 
control variables, such as the length of presentations (log(total words)), firm size (log(market equity)), the ratio of book 
equity to market equity at the end of the preceding quarter (book-to-market), the standard deviation of analysts’ 
earnings forecast in the most recent time period prior to the conference (uncertainty), and the differences between most 
recently reported firms’ earnings and analysts’ earnings forecast prior to the conference (earnings surprisest-1). Year 
dummies are also included as controls (year fixed effects). Standard errors clustered by industry sectors are presented in 
parentheses. **, * , +: significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively in a two-tailed test. 
  Forecast Revisionst+1 Forecast Revisionst+1 






Net positive words -0.429 -0.436 
 
(0.333) (0.332) 
Log(Total words) 0.004 0.005 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Log(Market equity) 0.032** 0.032** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Book-to-market -0.036* -0.037* 
 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Uncertainty 2.205+ 2.209+ 
 
(1.280) (1.281) 





Year  Y Y 
Firm Y Y 
   
Constant -0.276* -0.292* 
 
(0.112) (0.114) 
Observations 4,260 4,260 
R-squared 0.052 0.052 








The Association between Realism and Cumulative Stock Returns 30 Days After the Conference 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between the fractions of feeling words 
(feeling words) in executive presentations and firms’ future cumulative stock returns between 1 day and 30 days after 
the conference (CAR(1,30)). The key independent variable is realism words, the fractions of total words in an 
executive’s speech that refer to tangible, immediate, and practice issues and objects. The key control variable is the 
fractions of financial positive words minus financial negative words in a presentation (net positive words). Each 
regressions also includes a number of other control variables, such as the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings 
forecast in the most recent time period prior to the conference (uncertainty), the length of presentations (log(total 
words)), firm size (log(market equity)), the ratio of book equity to market equity at the end of the preceding quarter 
(book-to-market), and the differences between most recently reported firms’ earnings and analysts’ earnings forecast 
prior to the conference (earnings surprisest-1). Year dummies are also included as controls (year fixed effects). Standard 
errors clustered by industry sectors are presented in parentheses. **, * , +: significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively in a two-tailed test. 
  CAR(1,30) CAR(1,30) 






Net positive words 0.761+ 0.748+ 
 
(0.376) (0.376) 
Uncertainty 0.136 0.136 
 
(0.658) (0.658) 
Log(Total words) -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Log(Market equity) -0.083** -0.083** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) 
Book-to-market 0.052* 0.052+ 
 
(0.024) (0.024) 





Year  Y Y 
Firm Y Y 
 
  
Constant 1.202** 1.198** 
 
(0.326) (0.326) 
Observations 4,505 4,505 
R-squared 0.071 0.072 






Predicting Firm Future Performance Using Executives’ Language 
This table reports firm-fixed effect regression estimations of the association between the fractions of feeling words 
(feeling words) in executive presentations and firms’ return on equity reported one quarter after the conference 
(profitabilityt+1) and return on equity two quarters after the conference (profitabilityt+2). The key independent variable 
is realism words, the fractions of total words in an executive’s speech that refer to tangible, immediate, and practice 
issues and objects. The key control variable is the fractions of financial positive words minus financial negative words 
in a presentation (net positive words). Each regressions also includes a number of other control variables, such as the 
standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast in the most recent time period prior to the conference (uncertainty), 
the length of presentations (log(total words)), firm size (log(market equity)), the ratio of book equity to market equity at 
the end of the preceding quarter (book-to-market), the differences between most recently reported firms’ earnings and 
analysts’ earnings forecast prior to the conference (earnings surprisest-1), and firms’ return on equity reported one 
quarter prior the conference (profitabilityt+1). Year dummies are also included as controls (year fixed effects). Standard 
errors clustered by industry sectors are presented in parentheses. **, * , +: significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively in a two-tailed test. 
  Profitabilityt+1 Profitabilityt+1 Profitabilityt+2 Profitabilityt+2 










Net positive words -0.091 -0.089 0.174** 0.170** 
 
(0.059) (0.056) (0.044) (0.043) 
Log(Total words) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Market equity) 0.012** 0.012** -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Book-to-market -0.026* -0.026* -0.026** -0.026** 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Uncertainty 0.247* 0.247* 0.273* 0.273* 
 
(0.093) (0.093) (0.104) (0.104) 
Earnings surprisest-1 -0.006 -0.006 -0.012 -0.012 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Profitabilityt-1 0.158 0.158 0.290* 0.290* 
 
(0.103) (0.103) (0.136) (0.136) 
Fixed Effects 
    
Year  Y Y Y Y 
Firm Y Y Y Y 
     
Constant -0.162** -0.161** 0.054 0.052 
 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.065) (0.065) 
Observations 4,486 4,486 4,486 4,486 
R-squared 0.068 0.068 0.094 0.094 








While prior research has focused more extensively on the legitimating effect of 
language for new ventures, this dissertation draw from research in social psychology to 
investigate whether, how, and when language can be used by executives of public firm to 
manage external investor evaluation of the firm. This dissertation use computerized 
content analysis to quantify executive use of two types of words, feeling and realism 
words, and examine their impact on investors. In this final chapter, I will review the 
research contributions of this dissertation, as well as discuss directions for future 
research. 
Conclusion and contribution 
This dissertation makes several empirical and theoretical contributions to the 
strategy literature. First, by incorporating the insights from social psychology, this study 
provides an alternative theoretical framework for understanding the role of language in 
organizational settings. From a sociological perspective, prior research provided rich 
understanding of the legitimating effect of language for new ventures (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens et al., 2007). Given the importance of 
communication between executives and external investors, this dissertation departed from 
prior literature and focus on language used by executives of public firms. Specifically, 
this dissertation focused on identifying the type of language that can be used strategically 
to achieve persuasion and influence investor attitude and identifying the type of language 




from social psychology, this study enriches our understanding about the ways that 
language influence key stakeholders.  
Second, while language is commonly viewed as free for all to use and talk is 
commonly considered cheap, this dissertation provides a theory that suggests that this 
claim may not be true for all types of language. In fact, research in social psychology 
provided evidences that one’s use of realism language is connected to his or her 
psychological distances from the object or event described. Thus, this dissertation 
provides some evidence that the role of language in financial setting might be more 
complex than previously thought. 
Third, this study contributes to the strategy literature by providing empirical 
evidence regarding the effect of two types of words, feeling and realism words, on 
investor reaction. It also provided empirical evidences about how the effect of language 
on investors will vary under various organizational conditions, such as high asset 
intangibility, low profitability, low growth, and high firm-specific uncertainty. While the 
importance of language in organizational setting has long been recognized, large-scale 
empirical examination of language effect in organizations remain scant (see Martens et 
al., 2007 for an exception). More importantly, our knowledge of the specific types of 
language that will matter and under what conditions will it matter remain limited. This 
paper contributes to the strategy research by empirically demonstrating the effect of two 
types of language, the use of feeling and realism words. More importantly, this study 
provides empirical evidences for the long recognized and yet unexamined boundary 




on the interaction between executive language and firm asset composition, profitability, 
growth potential, and uncertainty.  
Fourth, organization and strategy scholars have long been interested in how 
corporate executives affect critical organizational outcomes (Carpenter et al., 2004; 
Finkelstein et al., 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Although there is a growing body of 
research that explores the implications of executives’ actions in the financial market (e.g., 
Certo, 2003; Cohen & Dean, 2005; Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Wade et al., 1997; Westphal 
& Zajac, 1998; Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), the effect of executive language on investor 
attitude represents a fairly nascent and uncharted territory. This study contributes to this 
literature by identifying and empirically demonstrating another important channel-
executive language-through which executive action influence investor evaluation.  
Last but not least, by relaxing the strong assumption regarding market efficiency, 
this study takes a psychological perspective and focus more on the general tendency of 
human beings to react favorably to certain types of persuasive language when processing 
new information. While some prior studies have typically focused on the effect of 
executive language from a more rational perspective, which means that financial market 
participants respond to executive language because it contains information regarding a 
firm’s fundamental value (e.g., Tetlock et al, 2008; Demers & Vega, 2008), I develop a 
theory to suggest that investors are motivated to collect and process all information 
(quantitative or qualitative) that they considered relevant to a firm’s valuation to improve 
the accuracy of their belief.  Emotional message that discusses executives’ feelings 




similar feelings from investors even if it contains no real information regarding the firm’s 
fundamental value. 
Limitations & Future directions 
The approach in this study is not without its limitations. Future research can 
extend the current work by addressing some of these shortcomings. First, findings in this 
dissertation are based on the context of large and established firms, thus limiting the 
generalizability of these findings to entrepreneurial and/or small firms. For example, in 
the context of large and mostly legitimate firms, the use of feeling words might appeal to 
investors’ feelings toward the firm and might be perceived as informative. However, in 
the context of small and not-yet-legitimate firms, investors’ reaction to feeling words 
might be significantly different because nascent firms lack the performance track record 
to supplement their claims. As a result, the use of feeling words might suggest that the 
venture and its ideas are not based on anything substantive.   
Second, the findings of this study is based on verbal transcripts of executive 
presentations, it is possible that different types of language will be more prevalent and 
thus influential in the context of written communication. For example, if I had conducted 
the study using other written communication between executives and investors, such as 
annual reports or IPO prospectuses, I might have found different results because 
executives may avoid referring to their subjective feelings in written communications, 
since these documents make it easy for investors to go after unjustified subjective 
opinions. Future research might advance the understanding in this area by addressing 
these alternative explanations and examining the effect of verbal styles in the setting of 




managerial language used in written versus verbal communications and how investor 
responses may vary depending on the communication mechanism.  
Third, the study of language only represents one of the many ways that an 
individual can achieve persuasion or convey value-related information in communication. 
Communication experts generally agree that beside verbal content, there are various 
nonverbal attributes (e.g., appearance, facial expression, and gestures) and vocal 
attributes (e.g., voice intonation, speed, and volume) that may provide information. For 
instance, Chen, Yao, & Kotha (2009) have demonstrated the effect of nonverbal cues 
(e.g., facial expressions and body language) on investors’ perception of passion in 
entrepreneur’s business plan presentation. Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012) have 
demonstrated that vocal cues of emotional states embedded in executive voice are 
incorporated by investors into stock market prices. Thus, a fruitful avenue for future 
research might be to explore how nonverbal cues in conference presentations influence 
stock reaction. Also, future studies could examine how the interplay between verbal and 
nonverbal cues of emotion in executive presentation will influence investor evaluation.  
Fourth, the verbal styles examined in this study might be correlated with 
unobservable characteristics of the firm and the presenting executives. I have tried to 
limit the influence of firm characteristics on executives’ word use by testing hypotheses 
using a firm fixed-effect and firm-speaker fixed-effect model, and thus holding constant 
characteristics of firms and speakers. I also controlled for many conventional firm 
characteristics that have been identified in prior literature to influence stock market 




 APPENDIX A: VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
 
Variable Name Description (Data Source, Calculation details) 
Details of the Conference and Presentations 
Conference date The date of the presentation 
Obtained from Thomson Reuter’s StreetEvents presentation transcripts 
Conference time The time of conference 
Conference name The name of the conference 
Conference organizer From the name of the conference, typically the organizer of the conference can 
be inferred 
Presenter name The names of executives who presented at the conference (coded as presenter 1 
and presenter 2) 
Presenter position The position of the executive (e.g. CEO, CFO, President and CEO) 
Presentation A collection of texts of the entire presentation given 
Questions A collection of texts of all questions asked by unidentified audience 
Answers A collection of texts of all answers given by the presenting executives 
Characteristics of Executives’ Presentation 
Affective words The number of affect-based words in the presentation transcripts as measured 
using the LIWC dictionary as positive and negative affects (e.g. love, nice, 
sweet, hurt, ugly, and disgusting) 
Cognitive words The number of cognition-based words in the presentation transcripts as 
measured using the LIWC dictionary as words referring to cognitive processes, 
such as thinking, knowing, considering, cause-and-effect relationship, and 
evaluation (e.g. think, know, consider, cause, ought, because, effect, hence, 
should, would, could). 
Vivid words The number of image-based words in the presentation transcripts as measured 
using the Regressive Imaginary Dictionary (RID) created by Martindale (1969) 
and was calculated using the WordStat software 
Emphasis words Words indicating emphasis in realms of speed, frequency, causality, 
inclusiveness, quantity or quasi-quantity, accuracy, validity, scope, size, 
clarity, exceptionality, intensity, likelihood, certainty and extremity as 
measured using General Inquirer’s Harvard IV-4 dictionary 
Concreteness Words denoting tangibility and materiality as measured using Diction 5.0. 
Included are sociological units (peasants, African-Americans, Catholics), 
occupational groups (carpenter, manufacturer, policewoman), and political 
alignments (Communists, congressman, Europeans). Also incorporated are 
physical structures (courthouse, temple, store), forms of diversion (television, 
football, CD-ROM), terms of accountancy (mortgage, wages, finances), and 
modes of transportation (airplane, ship, bicycle). In addition, the dictionary 
includes body parts (stomach, eyes, lips), articles of clothing (slacks, pants, 
shirt), household animals (cat, insects, horse) and foodstuffs (wine, grain, 
sugar), and general elements of nature (oil, silk, sand). 
Optimism Language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting their 
positive entailments 
Formula: [Praise+Satisfaction+Inspiration]-[Blame+Hardship+Denial] 
As measured by Diction 5.0 
Complexity A measure of the average number of characters per word in the presentation 
transcript (The bigger the word size, the more complex the language) as 
measured by Diction 5.0 
Embellishment The ratio between descriptive (e.g. adjective s) and functional words (e.g. 
verbs). 
Variety A measure of linguistic dispersion 
Positive valence The number of words indicating positive outlook as measured using a 1,915-





Negative valence The number of words indicating negative outlook as measured using a 2,291-
word dictionary of negative outlook in General Inquirer’s Harvard IV-4 
dictionary 
Certainty Language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness and a 
tendency to speak ex cathedra 
Formula: [Tenacity+Leveling+Collectives+Insistence]-[Numerical 
terms+Ambivalence+Self-reference+Variety] 
Measured using Diction 5.0 
Financial negative To create the financial negative, financial positive, and financial uncertainty 
word lists, Loughran and McDonald (2009) first develop a dictionary of words 
and word counts from all 10-Ks filed during 1994 to 2008. They carefully 
examine all words occurring in at least 5% of the documents, to consider their 
most likely usage in financial documents (including inflections). Words that we 
include beyond the 5% level are typically inflections of root words that made 
the original cut.  
 
They account for simple negation only for Fin-Pos words. Simple negation is 
taken to be observations of one of six words (no, not, none, neither, never, 
nobody) occurring within three words preceding a positive word. We would 
not expect to see phrases such as “not terrible earnings” in a report, so we do 
not consider negation for the negative word lists.  
 
Unlike the Hardvard IV-4 dictionary’s negative words list, the Fin-Neg list is 
specific to business terminology. In the language of business, words like 
increase or decrease are tonally ambiguous. In this case, what these words 
imply depends on whether they precede words such as revenues or costs.  
 
Of the 2,337 words in our Fin-Neg list, about half (1,121) overlap with the 
Harvard IV-4 dictionary. Frequently occurring words in this list that are not on 
the H4N-Inf list include: restated, litigation, termination, discontinued, 
penalties, unpaid, investigation, misstatement, misconduct, forfeiture, serious, 
allegedly, noncompliance, deterioration, and felony. 
(Source: Loughran and McDonald, 2009) 
Financial positive The Fin-Pos word list consists of 353 words including inflections, substantially 
fewer words than in the negative word list. Loughran and McDonald (2009) 
suggest that there are few positive words that are not easily compromised. 
They argue that knowing that readers are using a document to evaluate the 
value of a firm, writers are likely to be circumspect and avoid negative 
language, instead qualifying positive words, often in ways not easily detected 
by a parsing program. The tone of negative words has a much more pervasive 
effect. Words in our Fin-Pos list such as achieve, attain, efficient, improve, 
profitable, or upturn are more unilateral in potential tone. We include a 
positive word list more in the interest of symmetry than in an expectation of 
discerning an impact on tone identification. 
(Source: Loughran and McDonald, 2009) 
Financial uncertainty The Fin-Uncertainty list includes words denoting uncertainty, with emphasis 
on the general notion of imprecision rather than exclusively focusing on risk. 
The list includes 285 words such as 
approximate, contingency, depend, fluctuate, indefinite, uncertain, and 
variability 
(Source: Loughran and McDonald, 2009) 
Stock market reaction 
Cumulative abnormal 
return (1-day) 















The sum of abnormal stock return on the day of the event and five days before 
and five days after.  
(Source: CRSP) 
Firm Characteristics 
Total assets The firm’s total assets on the day before the event.  
(Source: Merged CRSP/Compustat) 
Total employees The firm’s total number of employees on the day before the event 
(Source: Merged CRSP/Compustat) 
Total revenue The firm’s total sales on the day before the event 
(Source: Merged CRSP/Compustat) 
ROA The firm’s last announced quarterly ROA prior to the presentation. I calculated 
ROA = (Income before extraordinary items + Interest expenses + Deferred 
income tax)/total assets 
(Source: Merged CRSP/Compustat) 
ROE The firm’s last announced quarterly ROE prior to the presentation (could be 
the current quarter or the last quarter depending on the announcement date and 
event date) 
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
Unexpected net income The differences between the most recently announced net income prior to 
presentation and the forecasted net income by analysts for the same period (net 
income quarterly on the quarter of presentation minus the quarterly net income 
from t-4) 
(Some data are missing because presentation in 2010 Q1 do not have earnings 
data yet) 
Unexpected net income 
standardized 
(Unexpected_net income – Mean of unexpected net income over the last 20 
qtrs)/Std. deviation of unexpected net income over the last 20 qtrs 
Unexpected net sales The differences between net sales prior to presentation and expected net sales 
(net sales quarterly on the quarter of presentation minus the quarterly net sales 
from t-4) 
(Some data are missing because presentation in 2010 Q1 do not have earnings 
data yet) 
Unexpected net sales 
standardized 
(Unexpected_net sales – Mean of unexpected net sales over the last 20 
qtrs)/Std. deviation of unexpected net sales over the last 20 qtrs 
Performance variability The standard deviation of ROA in the 3 years before the events 
 
ROA 3yr avg The firm’s average ROA in the 3 years before the event  
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
Sales growth 3yr avg The firm’s average sales growth in 3 years before the event 
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
Equity growth 3yr avg The firm’s average equity growth in 3 years before the event 
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
Employee growth 3yr 
avg 
The firm’s average employees growth in 3 years before the event 
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
GICS Industry membership according to Global Industry Classification System 
(Source: Thomson Reuter’s StreetEvents presentation transcripts) 
SIC SIC code 
(Source: Merged CRSP/Compustat) 
Industry level 
uncertainty 
Calculated based on Folta et al, 2006 
Industry level R&D 
intensity 





Firm reputation Fortune’s ranking 
(Source: Thomson One Banker or Compustat) 
Stock Characteristics 
Shares outstanding The number of shares outstanding on the day before the event 
(Source: CRSP) 
Market capitalization Total market equity at the end of preceding quarter prior to conference 
(Source: CRSP) 
Trading volume The average trading volume of the stock (calculated using the estimation 
period 250 days before the presentation) 
(Source: CRSP) 
Stock volatility1 The pre-calculated stock volatility; use this item to calculate the stock 
variability in the 4 years before the event 
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
Stock volatility2 The standard deviation of quarterly earnings during the 4 years before the 
event 
(Source: CRSP or Thomson One) 
Pre-conference EPS The earnings per share at the end of preceding quarter prior to conference 
(Source: CRSP) 
Institutional ownership1 The percentage of shares hold by institutions 
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
Institutional ownership2 The number of shares hold by institutions 
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
Insider ownership1 The percentage of shares hold by insiders (Firm executives) 
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
Insider ownership2 The number of shares hold by insiders 
(Source: Thomson One Banker) 
Analysts forecasts and recommendations 
Analysts numeber The number of analysts following a firm’s stock; not sure if I can get exactly 
that without pulling the detail file and calculate manually. 
(Source: IBES) 
Forecasts The median and mean consensus forecasts of the firm’s stock earning per share 
published before the presentation (I match the date of earning forecasts with 
the event date) 
(Source: IBES) 
Actuals The actual announced earning of the firm  
(Source: IBES) 
Earning surprise1 The differences between forecasted earnings per share and the actual 
announced earnings adjusted by the stock price in the last period before the 
event (I match the date of the event with the date of earning announcement; so 
it is the Thomson Reuters’ records of earning surprises before the presentation 
regardless whether it is for the last quarter or two quarters ago). 
 
To estimate the forecast error (FE) as a measure of the earnings surprise, 
we calculate the difference between announced earnings as reported by I/B/E/S 
(eiq) and the consensus earnings forecast (Fiq), defined as the median of the 
most recent forecasts from individual analysts using the I/B/E/S detail tape. 
The difference between the announced earnings and the consensus forecast is 
normalized by the stock price at the end of the corresponding quarter (Piq). 
To exclude stale forecasts when we calculate the consensus forecast, we only 
include one- or two-quarter-ahead forecasts issued or reviewed in the last 60 
calendar days before the earnings announcement. If an analyst made multiple 
forecasts during that period, we take her most recent forecast. Earnings, 





Earning surprise2 The pre-calculated earning surprise provided by IBES in the last period before 
the event (I match the date of the event with the date of earning announcement; 
so it is the Thomson Reuters’ records of earning surprises before the 
presentation regardless whether it is for the last quarter or two quarters ago). 
(Source: IBES) 
SUE Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) is a means of comparing earnings 
surprise to the company’s track record of earnings surprise. For example, Cisco 
was once said to consistently beat earnings estimates by a penny. Thus, if the 
company did beat by a penny it was hardly unexpected. A method frequently 
used in academic research to adjust for this factor is the standardized 
unexpected earnings, or SUE. 
SUE = the earnings surprise at a given time divided by the standard deviation 
of earnings surprises measured over some historic period such as the previous 
20 quarters (for example: consider a stock that had a $0.03 earnings surprise, 
and that the standard deviation of past earnings surprises is $0.05. The surprise 
is smaller than normal, and the standardized earnings surprise would be 




The number of stock recommendations for the firm  
(Source: IBES) 
Sellbefore1 The percentage of analysts provided “sell” recommendations for the firm’s 
stock in the last period before the event (I match the date of the event with the 
date of recommendations entered into IBES; so it is the Thomson Reuters’ 
records of sell recommendations before the presentation regardless whether it 
is for the last quarter or two quarters ago). 
(Source: IBES) 
Holdbefore1 The percentage of analysts provided “hold” recommendations for the firm’s 
stock in the last period before the event (I match the date of the event with the 
date of recommendations entered into IBES; so it is the Thomson Reuters’ 
records of hold recommendations before the presentation regardless whether it 
is for the last quarter or two quarters ago). 
(Source: IBES) 
Buybefore1 The percentage of analysts provided “buy” recommendations for the firm’s 
stock in the last period before the event (I match the date of the event with the 
date of recommendations entered into IBES; so it is the Thomson Reuters’ 
records of buy recommendations before the presentation regardless whether it 
is for the last quarter or two quarters ago). 
(Source: IBES) 
Sellafter1 The percentage of analysts provided “sell” recommendations for the firm’s 
stock after the event (I match the date of recorded recommendations with the 
event date; so it is the Thomson Reuters’ records of sell recommendations after 
the presentation in the next quarter). 
(Source: IBES) 
Holdafter1 The percentage of analysts provided “hold” recommendations for the firm’s 
stock after the event (I match the date of recorded recommendations with the 
event date; so it is the Thomson Reuters’ records of sell recommendations after 
the presentation in the next quarter). 
(Source: IBES) 
Buybafter1 The percentage of analysts provided “buy” recommendations for the firm’s 
stock after the event (I match the date of recorded recommendations with the 
event date; so it is the Thomson Reuters’ records of sell recommendations after 









Feeling words Feeling words are calculated as the fraction of total words in a 
presentation that refer to the sender’s subjective impression of an 
object or issue, such as his or her feelings, opinions, and beliefs. 
Example of key words in this dictionary are “feel”, “feeling”, 
“opinion”, “view”, “belief”. 
Net positive words I used the dictionary of financial negative and positive words 
developed by Loughran and McDonald (2009) to measure the fraction 
of total words that are negative and positive in financial setting and 
then calculate the use of net positive words by subtract the percentage 
of total words that are negative financial words from the percentage 
of total words that are positive financial words. 
Realism words This variable refers to “language describing tangible, immediate, 
recognizable matters that affect people’s everyday lives” (Hart, 
2000:50). It is calculated as the percentage of total words that are 
realism-based, using a computerized content analysis program called 
Diction 6.0 (Hart 2001). 
 
Realism = [Spatial Awareness + Temporal Awareness + 
Present Concern + Human Interest + Concreteness + 
Familiarity] – [Past Concern + Complexity]  
 
Tentative words Words that indicate low degree of certainty in one’s statements and 
the distance between the speaker and his/her statements, such as 
“maybe”, “perhaps”, and “guess”. 
Future-oriented 
words 
Future-oriented words are used when discussing about the future and 
is identified using a dictionary of words that refer to future tense, such 
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